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INTRODUCrION

The Japanese Constitution' is an odd case much discussed by students of comparative law and constitutions. Its birth was certainly an
unnatural event; drafted primarily in English by Americans over a few
days in a country under occupation, it was imposed on an extremely
reluctant conservative Japanese government. But procedurally, the
enactment of the Constitution was flawless, as all constitutionally
mandated procedures were followed. Over the last fifty years, Conservative Japanese politicians have intermittently pointed to the special circumstances of the drafting to criticize the Constitution as an
alien transplant, a document replete with western v-alues that does
not suitJapan with its group-oriented, homogeneous society based on
Confucian values. Some western commentators have echoed this
theme! In fact, the sweeping guarantees of human rights have not
Professor, Faculty of Intercultural Communication, Ryukoku UniversityJapan. J.D.
The Constitution was promulgated on November 3, 1946 and took effect on May 3, 1947.
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its predecessor, the Meiji Constitution, which was introduced on February 11, 1889 and made
effective on November 28, 1890. This practice emphasizes the origin of the present day Constitution as Japan's defeat in World War II and the subsequent military occupation. Japanese
practice, however, does not emphasize the past, but rather underscores that the document belongs to Japan by referring to the present Constitution as simply the Constitution (Kenpo) or
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been fully implemented in the more than fifty years since the adoption of the Constitution. The gap between the apparent guarantees
of the Constitution and the actual scope of protection afforded by the
Constitution is attributed to a naturalizing or 'Japanizing" of the
Constitution by interpretation to better suit the Japanese society in
which it was planted.' This "naturalized" Constitution is also often
praised as a pragmatic success.' Although in practice it provides far
fewer protections for individual rights than seem to be mandated by
its provisions or are guaranteed by its American and European models, commentators consider the Constitution a success because of the
economic recovery and development of Japan since the end of World
War II. Parts of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)6 have made this
argument continuously during its almost unbroken rule since 1955.,
Certainly the Japanese Constitution is worth consideration both
because it is one of the oldest functioning constitutions in the world
and one closely watched by its Asian neighbors as a possible model
(Dan Fenno Henderson ed., 1969); Tanaka Hideo, The Conflict between Two Legal Traditions in
Making the Constitution ofJapan, in DEMOCRATIZINOJAPAN: THE ALLIED OCCUPATION 107, 111-12
(Robert E. Ward & Sakamnoto Yoshikazu eds., 1987) (noting that the need for drastic changes to
the Constitution had not yet been recognized by the Japanese people but was, instead, forced
by the Allied Forces). But see Theodore H. McNelly, "Induced Revolution": The Policy and Process of
ConstitutionalReform in OccupiedJapan, in DEMOCRATIZINGJAPAN, supra, at 76 (arguing that, had
the Constitution been drafted publicly and subjected to popular referendum, it would have
been substantively similar to the one imposed by the Allied forces).
' See, e.g., MASAJI CHIBA, LEGAL PLURALISM: TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY THROUGHJAPANESE
LEGAL CULTURE 113-14 (1989) ("[O]fficial law is competed with or very often undermined by

the significant function of unofficial law.") (referring to the Japanese Supreme Court's treatment of the separation of church and state under the Japanese Constitution). Cf. Christopher
A. Ford, The Indigenization of Constitutionalismin theJapaneseExperience, 28 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L
L. 3, 39 (1996).
See, e.g.,John M. Maid, The Constitution ofJapan:Pacifism, PopularSovereignty, and Fundamental Human Rights, inJAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39, 48 (Percy R. Luney & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993). This argument leads to a debate over whether the Japanese legal system is a
model suitable for export. SeeJAPAN: ECONOMIC SUCCESS & LEGAL SYSTEM (Harold Baum ed.,
1996). For a more general treatment of the idea that economic growth substitutes for civil and
political rights in the Asian context, see Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate, 15 AUSTL Y.B. INT'L. L. 1 (1994).
6 Despite its name, the LDP is a highly conservative party, or rather a collection of factions.
See PATRICK SMITH, JAPAN: A REINTERPRETATION 302 (1997) ("The well-worn clich6 in Tokyo,
only too true, has it that the L.D.P. is neither liberal nor democratic nor a party.").
' The LDP held power continuously from its inception in 1955 until 1993. See generally
MICHAEL SCHALLER, ALTERED STATES: THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN SINCE THE OCCUPATION
(1997) (providing a detailed history of LDP rule with particular emphasis on its effect on international relations). However, if one were to include the tenure of the two conservative parties
that combined to form the LDP, the same group has been in power almost continually since the
end of the war in 1945. The control of these conservative parties was interrupted only briefly by
a period of socialist rule under Katayama Tetsu from June 1, 1947 to February 10, 1948. After
being voted out of power in 1993, the LDP rapidly returned to governance by forming a coalition with minor opposition parties. The almost unbroken rule of this single conservative group
is widely recognized as having affected the development of constitutional law in postwarJapan.
See, eg., Yasuhiro Okudaira, Forty Years of the Constitution and Its Various Influences:Japanese,American, and European, inJAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at I (describing the effect of
LDP power on the appointment of Supreme Courtjustices and the decisions of the Court).
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for development.8 It is even possible that those interested in constitutional stirrings in the rest of Asia and Eastern Europe may draw some
lessons from Japan's experience with grafting a democratic constitution onto a discredited and collapsing authoritarian system fiercely
opposed to change.
But it is not easy to discuss the Japanese Constitution. Virtually
every aspect of it, including the summary of facts sketched above, is
highly controversial and contested. For example, the apparently minor fact that the Constitution has never been amended elicits diametrically opposed interpretations.! The absence of amendment may be
seen as proof of the Constitution's stability and the satisfaction of the
Japanese people with their fundamental law. On closer examination,
however, the failure to amend the text by the legally mandated procedures while simultaneously permitting government actions and
practices that violate the Constitution may be a sign of decay, rather
than strength, indicating the absence of the rule of law.' If interpretation of key parts of the Constitution rests in the hands of the executive, not the judiciary, as is the case with the pacifism provision of Article 9, then the meaning of the Constitution can change with shifting
political coalitions, as it now does. In effect, as this article explains,
the Constitution often may have been radically and undemocratically
amended despite its apparently pristine text."
Also, under dispute are which facts are relevant to an account of
constitutionalism in Japan. If one focuses on the events in the capital, Tokyo, and on the opinions of the conservative elite, who have
ruled for more than one hundred years with great distaste for popular rule, then a picture emerges of a society and culture with little experience of or use for individual rights, a society based on harmony
(wa) in which individuals willingly submerge even their basic needs
8As Lawrence

Beer and Hiroshi Itoh explained, the Japanese Constitution is one "of [only]

twenty single-document national constitutions whose ratification dates before 1950 [whereas]
about 130 out of 181 constitutions have been finalized since 1970 ...
L."t. ,NCE BEER &
HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OFJAPAN, 1970 THROt:CH 1990 ix (1996) [hereinafter BEER & ITOH, 1970 THROUGH 1990].
' See Maid, supra note 5, at 48 ("After more than forty years of experience, not a single grave
defect in the structure of government has developed, at least not a defect serious enough to
have created the necessity... for constitutional amendment."). But seeS.tmi, supra note 6,at
309 (arguing that a new constitution is the only way to cure Japan's neurosis of history and to
enable Japan to assume the responsibilities which accompany its economic prominence).
10 One must note that the prescribed amendment procedure is onerous. The Constitution
requires:
Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a
concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House
and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for the ratification, which
shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a
special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.
KENP6 [Constitution] art. 96(1).
" See infra notes 129-158 and accompanying text; se also infia notes 98-100 and accompanying text for an overview of efforts to explicitly amend the Constitution.
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and desires for the common good, defined by the government as
primarily economic development. On this set of facts the Japanese
Constitution, with its three basic principles of popular sovereignty,
pacifism, and human rights, seems anomalous. But there are other
sets of facts and strands in the development of Japanese constitutionalism, discussed more often in the literature on Japanese history than
in law journals," that suggest a far more complex picture of a long,
indigenous tradition in Japan aspiring to freedom, democracy and
human dignity dating back to the emergence of the modern state in
the 1860s." This dissident tradition made up of various components
has been repeatedly overwhelmed by the conservative ruling elite, but
it continues even now and is having a significant affect on the course
ofJapanese constitutional litigation."
The political history of modem Japan, which is to a considerable
extent a struggle over the meaning of constitutional law, consists of
the struggle between conservative governing elites and the culture
they wish to promote, and various movements by ordinary citizens to
redefine the values and aims of the state. An understanding of this
2

For a representative example of this type, see Kendrick F. Royer, The Demise of the World's

FirstPacifist ConstitutionsJapanese ConstitutionalInterpretationand the Growth of Executive Power War,
26 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 749, 754 (1993) ("After studying primarily German and French legal
models, in 1889 the Japanese settled for an imperial constitution modeled after the Prussian
monarchical constitution.").
" For an introduction into this history, see MIKISO HANE, PEASANTS, REBELS, AND
OUTCASTES: THE UNDERSIDE OF MODERN JAPAN (1982); TESSA MORRIS-SuzuKI, SHOWA: AN
INSIDE HISTORY OF HIROHITO'SJAPAN (1984); THE OTHERJAPAN: CONFLICT, COMPROMISES AND
RESISTANCE SINCE 1945 (Joe Moore ed., 1997); REFLECTIONS ON THE WAY TO THE GALLOWs:
REBEL WOMEN IN PREWARJAPAN (Mikiso Hane ed. & trans., 1988).
Terms such as "homogeneous" and "Confucian" are highly contestable and misleading
when used to describe the Japanese society. TheJapanese society is not homogenous. See, e.g.,
JAPAN's MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY (Michael Weiner ed., 1997). Moreover,
the Japanese government has manipulated the image of Japan, at times trying to persuade the
Japanese that their country is multiethnic, and at others times trying to persuade them that it is
homogeneous, depending upon which served governmental political objectives. See OGUMA
EIJI, TANITSU MINZOKU SHINWA NO KIGEN [THE ORIGIN OF THE MYrH OF THEJAPANESE ETHNIC
HOMOGENEITY] (1995); see also TESSA MORRIS-SUZUKI, RE-INVENTING JAPAN: TIME, SPACE,
NATION 80-109 (1998) (providing a summary in English of the government's effort).
Confucianism is also complex and some of its strands support more than authoritarian
power structures. For example, Chinese communitarianism historically resisted state domination and could form the basis for human rights in China. See WM. THEODORE DEBARY, ASIAN
VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998); cf.
CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (WAm. Theodore deBary & Tu Weiming eds., 1998). Some
Japanese writers clearly understood the Confucian right to rebel against unjust rule. See
YASUNAGA TOSHINOBU, ANDO SHOEKI TO NAKAE CHOMIN [AND6 SHOERI AND NAKAE CHOMIN]
135-173 (1978); see also Vera Mackie, Freedom and the Family: Gendering Meiji Political Thought, in
ASIAN FREEDOMS: THE IDEA OF FREEDOM IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 121, 123 (David Kelly &
Anthony Reid eds., 1998) ("IT]he legitimacy of liberal ideas could be challenged by the dominance of Confucianist ideas, which emphasised hierarchy and obedience rather than equality
and freedom. But it was also possible to find justification in the Confucian tradition for rebellion against a ruler who did not show the necessary benevolence.").
" For a work in English which presents the viewpoints of such dissidentJapanese voices, see
GAVAN MCCORMACK, THE EMPTINESS OF JAPANESE AFFLUENCE (1996).
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ongoing conflict is essential for an understanding of how the Japanese Constitution arose, evolved over the past fifty years and is likely
to develop in the future. The struggle between these competing visions of the state and the individual arose at the founding of the
modern Japanese state, the so-called Meii Revolution, and the revolution remains unfinished." Far from being brought by the American
occupying forces, notions of democracy and human rights had been
percolating inside Japan for generations, growing out of both Confucian and western sources.'6 The occupation forces briefly tipped the
balance in favor of the minority tradition of democracy and human
rights only to reverse course and come down firmly on the side of the
prewar conservatives committed to authoritarian rule. Supported by
the United States government, the conservatives and their successors
have ruled-by what is often characterized as the iron fist in the velvet glove-almost without intermission until the present." The consequences of almost unbroken conservative rule for the Constitution,
and in particular for the effectiveness of its human rights provisions,
have been profound.
The tenacity ofJapanese individuals and groups committed to the
ideals underlying the original thrust of the Japanese Constitution also
has been considerable. Their efforts have resulted in waves of litigation first seeking the enforcement of constitutional guarantees," and
then, once the judiciary declined to provide effective relief, the enforcement of international human rights treaties." After an initial
coolness to such claims, a few lower courts are beginning to recognize
them and supply relief accordingly.'t But the Supreme Court and the
Several Japanese historians argue that the Meiji Revolution is not yet complete.

See

TANAKAAKRA, MIKAN NO MEIJI ISHIN [THE INCOMPLETE MEIJI REVOLLMONJ (1979); ,L.kAIURA

MASANORI, GENDAI 0 MANABU: SENGO KAI{AKU To GENDAI NIHON [A STUDY OF CONTEmPoARY
JAPANESE HISTORY: POSTWAR REFORM AND CONTEMPORARYJAPAN] 12-17 (1997).

See infra notes 22-43 and accompanying text.
The Japanese Constitution, and indeed all of Japanese postwar history, must be understood in the context of the United States' ongoing intervention in the sovereignty mid politics
ofJapan in order to preventJapan from becoming a neutralist state. Namely, te intervention
was intended to maintain Japan's place in the United States' military strategy for Asia. See
ScHAL..E, supra note 7, at 38-41 (describing the process of aligning Japan uith te United
States' foreign policy objectives by adopting the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in
1951). One of the most important aspects of this support involved massive. covert. finaincid
assistance to the LDP by the United States government that allowed the LDP to subvert elections, especially on the island of Okinawm. See iL at 135-36, 140, 159; SMmIt. supra note 6, at 17,
27-28, 30. The length of the LDP's rule has been achieved in part by structuring electoral districts so that rural votes have counted up to seven times as much as urban votes. The result is a
"mutant democracy in which elections function to deprive voters of their democratic rights."
See SMITH, supra, at 28.
" See infra notes 129-158 and accompanying text (discussing suits brought to enforce Article
9); see infra notes 103-128 and 200-245 and accompanying text (discussing non-Article 9 litigation).
See infra notes 277-303 and accompanying text.
2' A political sea change occurred in Japan in the 1990s which included a reopening of debate about the Constitution and human rights. The death of Emperor Hirohito. now posthu16
'7
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executive remain fiercely opposed to recognition of legal rights other
than those provided under the Constitution as it has been narrowly
construed by Japanese courts. The Japanese Constitution and human
rights, far from being alien transplants, are caught up in a struggle
over the nature of the state that stretches back to Meiji. In that
struggle, both sides, the conservatives and the supporters of human
rights have drawn on sources from outside for leverage, but the fight
is thoroughlyJapanese.
Part I of this article briefly sketches the struggle over control of
the state before the World War II, which forms the background of the
Japanese Constitution. Part II traces the birth of the Constitution
and discusses the large number of conflicting forces that lead to a
complex compromise. Particular attention is paid to the evolution of
the human rights provisions. Part III describes the course of postwar
constitutional development and offers an explanation for the highly
restrictive interpretations adopted by the Supreme Court. Part IV
contains an analysis of the more recent litigation based on human
rights treaties, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), and considers the significance of the periodic reporting process before the Human Rights Committee for the
implementation of human rights in Japan.
Although culture undoubtedly plays an important part in the unfolding of any society, and certainly does so in Japan, this article concentrates on history. Culture is riven with contradictions based on
age, class, gender and political orientation; it is malleable, and subject to conscious creation and manipulation. Attempts to understand
the Japanese Constitution without a firm grasp of history omit the political, and so risk the distortions of orientalism.' The historical mamously renamed Emperor Showa, must be recognized as an important factor in the reopening
of these Constitutional questions. Emperor Hirohito acted as regent for his incapacitated father from 1921 to 1926, and then reigned from 1926 to 1989. After his death, numerous books
and historical documents analyzing his reign appeared, resulting in a reappraisal of recent
Japanese history within Japan. Such a reexamination of the past was impossible during his lifetime.
Because most English speakers recognized Emperor Showa as Hirohito, his name when
he was alive, and many of the sources refer to him in this manner, this article refers to Emperor
Showa as Hirohito for the sake of clarity.
" ChalmersJohnson cautions westerners against too readily accepting cultural explanations
forJapanese politics.
For foreign nations attempting to influence Japanese policy making, it is
essential to remember that the obstacles to basic change in Japan are almost never whatJapanese spokesmen say they are. what stands in the way
is not the need for consensus, or an island mentality, or racial and cultural
differences. The obstacles to change are invariably political vested interests, but these may be harder to address and to alter than in other political
systems. This is so because although the tatemae [social convention] of Japan is a constitutional monarchy operating under the rule of law, the honne
[reality] is a developmental state based on a covert conservative alliance to
keep the people docile and preoccupied with nonessential matters. Such a
system can change, but only when the status quo has clearly become un-

1999]

INCOMPLETE REVOLUTIONS AND NOTSO ALIEV TR LYSPL-LVIS

421

trix is, of course, crucial in the birth and death of constitutions. The
hard question is whose history?
I. THE MEII CONSTITUTION AND THE BACKGROUND
OF THE BIRTH OF THEJAPANESE CONSTITUTION

Strictly speaking, one should say thatJapan has only ever had one
Constitution. The presentJapanese Constitution is, in fact, the Meiji
Constitution as amended in 1946 pursuant to its specified amendment procedures.' The continuity of form is not merely a technicality; even though every article of the Meiji Constitution was replaced,
the present Constitution remains profoundly affected by the Meji
period (1868-1912).' Specifically, the allied forces decision to govern
indirectly through the regime in place at the end of the war meant
that the political and legal arrangements established in the Meji Period directly affected the development of the Japanese Constitution.
That inheritance was complex. The period from the founding of the
modem Japanese state in 1868 until 1945 was far from harmonious.
A great divide over the rights of the individual and the authority of
the state developed, resulting in conflict over the development of the
Meiji Constitution, the control of freedom of speech and the proper
nature of education.
In 1868, after the samurai of the outlying and disfavored Satsuma
and Choshu clans successfully displaced the Shogunate, using the
Emperor in Kyoto as a talisman, their leaders became the de facto
government ofJapan. The leaders of the Japanese revolution, faced
with what they perceived to be the colonial intentions of the western
powers backed up by their technological superiority in armaments,
sought to transform Japan's feudal system of clans and an agrarian
economy into a strong, modem state in order to maintain Japan's independence. One of the triggers which had set off the military rebellion was samurai resentment against the weak Shogunate for negotiating so-called "unequal treaties" with the western powers," which

tenable.
Chalmers Johnson, The People 117w Inventd the Mchanieal Nightingale, in SHOWA: THE JARIPN OF

HuoHrro 71, 88 (Carol Gluck & Stephen R.Graubard eds., 1992).
22

Article 73 of the Meiji Constitution proided for its amendment:
(1) When it has become necessary in the future to amend the provisions of
the present Constitution, a project to the effect shall be submitted to the
Imperial Diet by Imperial Order [command].
(2) In the above case, neither House can open debate, unless not less than
two-thirds of the whole number of Members are present, and no amendment can be passed, unless a majority of not less than two-thirds of the
Members present is obtained.

MEUI KENP6 art. 73.
' See infra note 62 (describing the similarities in structure between the Meiji Constitution
and the presentJapanese Constitution).
" These "unequal treaties" included the Treaty of Edo, July 29. 1858. Japan-U.S.. 12 Stat.
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provided for the economic exploitation of Japan and humiliating
limitations on Japan's sovereignty, such as extra-territoriality provisions for westerners. The legal system had to be quickly overhauled
in order to renegotiate these treaties on an equal footing with the
western powers. But such changes did not necessarily entail a written
constitution and the Meiji oligarchs hesitated to draft one lest clarification of the structure of government open the way for others to
share in political power.
The decline of the Shogunate and the revolution had, however,
unleashed powerful forces in Japan.' A number of people, both
samurai and commoners, believed that the Meiji Restoration would
entail a social revolution which would result in participation by the
populace in public affairs. When the Satsuma and Choshu leaders set
about to carve up the spoils of power among themselves, transforming themselves into the tight-knit group ruling Japan," there was a
strong backlash. One manifestation was the Freedom and Popular
Rights Movement (Jiyd Minken Undo), which swept the nation, agitating for parliamentary democracy and a constitution. The movement
was not merely an urban phenomenon: one result of the movement
was the formation of groups even in rural villages to study, discuss
and draft a constitution forJapanY
Only since 1968, have scholars realized the extent of the grassroots movement for a constitutional government.' In that year, the
Japanese historian, Irokawa Daikichi discovered, tucked away in a rural storehouse, a sophisticated draft constitution written by a farmers'
group named the Learning and Debating Society.' Now, sixty-eight
1051 and the Treaty of Kanagawa, Mar. 31, 1854,Japan-U.S., 11 Stat. 597.
" These forces included millennial movements, such as the "What the Hell" (eeja nai ha)
movement, which caused thousands of people to abandon their homes, cast away money and
dance. This movement and other millennial phenomena, such as numerous peasant uprisings,
were harshly suppressed by authorities. See George Wilson, Pursuing the Millenium in the Meiji
Restoration, in CONFLICT IN MODERNJAPANESE HISTORY: THE NEGLECTED TRADITION 176 (Tetsuo
Najita &J.Victor Koschmann eds., 1982).
" The internal power struggles among Satsuma and Choshu may, however, have opened the
way for power to pass to the military. SeeJ. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES M. ROSENBLUTH, THE
POLITICS OF OLIGARCHY: INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE INIMPERIALJAPAN 30 (1995).
'7 See IROKAWA DAIKICHI, THE CULTURE OF THE MEUI PERIOD 107-122 (Stephen Viastos et al.
trans. Marius B.Jansen ed., 1985) (1970).
8 Such documents had to be hidden until 1945. Under the 1925 version of the Peace Preservation Law, it was a crime punishable by imprisonment of up to ten years to be a member or
supporter of an organization whose purpose was to propose a change in the "national polity"
(kokutai), which included the Imperial System set up under the Meiji Constitution. See Miyji
Masato, Kokusai Seiji Ka No KindaiNihon [Modern Japan in InternationalPolitics],3 NIHON TsusI
[COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OFJAPANI 195-96. A 1928 amendment to this law made such a crime
a capital offense. See id. at 209.
29 See IROKAWA, supra note 27, at 102-07.
Irokawa provides an extensive description of this
document and its historical context in relation to other private draft constitutions, such those
written by the Risshisha (a Tosa ex-samurai organization which was one of the earliest organizations to press for constitutional government) or by the Omei Society. See id. at 76-122; cf
Mackie, supra note 13, at 121-25 (describing the increased use of the term jiyfl (freedom) in the
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such private constitutions, called shigi kenp, have been discovered. '
These draft constitutions were not mere copies of alien models, but
rather were complex blends of a variety of Confucian and Western
sources. '
The Freedom and Popular Rights Movement reached its apex in
1881. The Meiji oligarchs crushed this along with other allied and
genuinely popular movements seeking democracy and a role for the
populace in constitution making.' The Meiji oligarchs, however, understood that the powerful forces pressing from below for social and
political revolution could not be ignored. Under the leadership of
Ito Hirobumi, they tried to devise a constitutional system which
would limit and contain popular pressure for representative government, in essence creating an illiberal constitution which primarily
imposed duties on Japanese citizens as imperial subjects. Nevertheless some provisions for individual rights had to be included in order
to gain the international respect from the western powers for the
Japanese legal system necessary for a renegotiation of the unequal
treaties.
One reason for the long delay in producing the Meji Constitution
was the time needed to create the legal and social framework necessary to constrain the effect of even a limited grant of rights. After an
internal power struggle, Ito Hirobumi emerged as the leader of the
oligarchs and set out to design the new constitution. The composition of the Meiji Constitution was essentially a private action by ho
and his assistants, later given legitimacy by having the Emperor
promulgate it.' Ito's solution to the danger of popular rule evolving
from a written constitution was to attempt to mold the persons who
would be covered by the Meiji Constitution by establishing a stateJapanese language following the translation intoJapanese of the U.S. Declaration of Independence, and Mill's On Liberty and the spread of liberal ideas derived from Confucianism and Westem thought).
See KosEKI SHoIcHT, THE BiRTH OFJAPAN'S POSTIVAR CONrnTUTO.N 26 (Ray A. Moore ed.
& trans., 1997). In comparison, the private constitutions drafted in Japan after World War 11
number in the "teens." See id
31 For example, a commoner named Chiba Takusaburo, who served as the teaching assistant
in the village elementary school, wrote the Itsukaichi Draft Constitution found by Irokawa.
Chiba's writings show a remarkable gift to utilize the terminology of traditional Confucian vritings and imperial proclamations to further a liberal constitutional order. As Irokawa explained,
"we see the principles of monarchical absolutism transformed into liberal sentiments with the
retention of almost identical vocabulary" in Chiba's writing. See IROKWA, supra note 27, at 105.
'See id. at 39-68.
" Se CAROL GLUcK,JAPAN'S MODERN MYTHS: IDEOLOGY IN THE LTE MEIJI PERIOD 43 (1985)
(explaining that the Meiji Constitution and subsequent ministerial decisions were passed
"through imperial hands for the sanction of legitimacy remaining, like the scroll [of the Meiji
Constitution], unchanged."). At the ceremony, Ito, President of the Privy Council. handed the
text he had written to Emperor Meiji, who in turn handed it as an imperial gift to the Prime
Minister. After World War II, Prince Konoe Fuminaro would try to replicate Ito's actions in
detail, including acting without dear authority to draft a constitution. He even chose seclude
himself and his aids in a rural retreat to produce the draft, as Ito had done. St&KOSEKI. supra
note 30, at 14-15.
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guided socialization through a tightly controlled, centralized system
of compulsory education and a civil code which significantly restructured the Japanese family system. Thus, in rapid succession appeared
the Meiji Constitution (1889), a set of education laws, most notably
the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), which set obedience as
the goal of education, and the Civil Code (1891), which regulated
family life by imposing the samurai family structure on the rest of the
populace for the first time in Japanese history."
Specifically, the Meiji oligarchs tried to control the country by
propagating two different theories of the Emperor, and consequentially two theories of the Meiji Constitution, in a two-track educational
system. Education for the masses was to include an exoteric doctrine
of the Emperor whereby the Emperor was promoted as an infallible,
mystical being. Myths, such as the unbroken line of Emperors springing from the Sun Goddess, ' were invented from fragments of traditional folk beliefs, Shinto religion and newly minted notions.' An
esoteric doctrine of the Emperor was taught at schools attended by
the future ruling elite. Under this latter theory, best represented by
the formulation of Tokyo Imperial University constitutional scholar
Minobe Tatsukichi, the Emperor was merely an organ of the state,
that is an element in a constitutional order run by humans.
The resistance to control was considerable from groups pressing
from below for a more genuinely popular representative system as
well as from ultraconservatives opposed to the esoteric doctrine. A
battery of laws had to be devised and repeatedly revised to try to contain the resistance. For example, in 1890, the Cabinet promulgated
the Public Meeting and Political Association Law, which banned outdoor political rallies. Later, national political organizations were
banned. And, as a direct blow to the feminists who had been active in
the Meiji Revolution and the now defunct Freedom and Popular
Rights Movement, attendance at political meetings by women, as well
as foreigners and minors, was made illegal.'
Even the intellectual leaders of the Meiji Enlightenment, the inner circle of the time, split over the proper nature of education in a
modern Japan due to differing views of the capacity of ordinary people and the purpose of government. The opposing positions, which
persist to the present day in Japan, have come to be characterized as

" One of the innovations of the Meiji government was the extension of patrilineal succession rules from the samurai class to the entire populace. See, e.g., Chizuko Ueno, The Position of
Japanese Women Reconsidered,28 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGIST 75, 78 (1987).
In fact the line has been broken repeatedly, including a major split between two branches
of the line, the Northern Dynasty and the Southern Dynasty.
For a description of this process, see GLUCK, supra note 33, at 73-156. See also IROKAWA,
supra note 27, at 245-311.
7 See LAWRENCE W. BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
INJAPAN: A STUDY INCOMPARATIVE LAW,
POLITICS AND SOcIETY 56 (1984) [hereinafter BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION].
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"enlightenment from above" and "enlightenment from below."' The
former, best exemplified by the first Minister of Education Mori Arinori, holds that an individual has no value in himself but rather exists
only to serve the state, that is the Emperor, and that the interests of
state are best served by obedience. Under this position, individuals
were encouraged to mobilize themselves to serve the goals of the
state, but those goals were to be set only from above. "Enlightenment
from below," on the other hand, usually identified with the nineteenth century intellectual and founder of Keio University, Fukuzawa
Yukichi, claimed that the modernization of Japan would be best
served by encouraging each individual to develop his or her own personal capabilities and an individualized vision of the ends of the
State.' Education, according to this alternate view, should foster pluralism and personal autonomy.
There was even a period of relative liberalism in government during the so-called Taisho Democracy," which experimented with various political innovations, such as jury trials." But as societal conflict
concerning justice for the rural poor grew and ferment in the cities
for social reform expanded, the government responded with a battery
of repressive laws designed to maintain its power and to quell the new
demands ofJapanese citizens. ' Finally, the military gained control of
the government in 1935. The theory of the Emperor as an organ of
the state was officially suppressed, while its author, Minobe Tatsukichi, was forced out of public life and his publications banned. Political parties were forced into a government-controlled, grand coalition in support of the war effort, opposition groups were suppressed.
Opposition leaders were either dead due to official executions or police assassinations, incarcerated, or, for those still at liberty, forced to
choose between collaboration with the government or silence. This

See TERUHISA HORIO, EDUcATIO,4AL THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN: STATE
AUTHORITYAND ,rrELLECrUAL FREEDOM 24-64 (Steven Platzer ed. & trans., 1988).
See HORiO, supra note 38, at 65. Although Fukuzawa nas a complicated figure with sometimes contradictory views, he was the first and one of the strongest advocates for the education
and freedom of women. See gen raUy FUKUZAWA YtJKICHI, FUKUZAV, YuKICHI oN JAP.NESE
Woit N: SELECrED WORKS (Eiichi Kiyooka ed. & trans., 1988).
"Taisho Democracy is either dated as 1905 to 1925, based on the peoples' popular movements culminating in achievement of universal male suffrage in 1925, or, from 1918 to 1935,
the period when Cabinets were organized on the basis of political parties.
" Japan had ajury system from 1928 until 1943 when the law was suspended. For a discussion of the system and its limitations, including its essentially conservative purpose, see Mamoru
in Japan]. in 9 SHIHO
Urabe, Wagakuni ni okent baishinsaiban no kenhyLi [A Study on Trial lrjy
KENSHFSHO CH6SA SOSHO 1-6, 112-20, 7qprinted in HmEO TANAA THEJAPANESE LEGA. Ssri.Lt
483-91 (1976).
, For a survey of these laws and their impact, see BEER, FREEDOM OF E.PRESSIO.N. supra note
37, at 59-99. For example, under a secret directive broadening the Peace Preservation Lm, a
person "who appears as if they might want to change the absolutism of the emperor %%sto be
arrested." I&. at 66. Seats were set aside for police at public meetings and an officer could stop
any meeting for unacceptable speech merely by shouting The speaker %ill stop!" (B&nshz
chfishO. Id.

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(Vol. 1: 3

was not a culture of harmony or wa. The opposition to the authoritarian regime was silenced, but not destroyed entirely. Its remnants
would wait out the war. The balance shifted when the conservatives
in power lost the war. The next question was whether they and their
program would lose in the ensuing peace."
II. THE BIRTH OF THE PRESENTJAPANESE CONSTITUTION
With the defeat of Japan and the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the future of the Meiji Constitution was in question. Paragraph 10 of the Potsdam Declaration specifically addressed the future
of human rights in Japan: "The Japanese Government shall remove
all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese People. Freedom of speech, of religion, and
of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental rights shall be established ....

""

The implementation of the Potsdam Declaration in

Japan was administered by the Supreme Command of the Allied
Powers in the Pacific ("SCAP") lead by General Douglas MacArthur
from general headquarters in Tokyo." Given the small number of
forces assigned to the occupation the decision was made to govern
and carry out the reforms through the existingJapanese government.
The wisdom of the decision has been much debated,46 and the consequences of this strategy clearly impacted on the future of the revised
constitution.

Nevertheless, a number of Japanese played a role in the constitution-making process. As in the early Meiji period, numerous nongovernmental groups and private individuals produced draft constitutions or proposals, which will be described briefly in Section A. As
had also happened in the early Meiji period, the conservatives in
0 The political activists who laid low waiting for the end of the war were not only urban intellectuals. The newspaper reporter Mark Gayn described visiting with a sharecropper in rural
Nagano Prefecture just after the war. The farmer had been imprisoned before the war for union activities and had been warned by his village policeman to "play the fool" during the war
and keep quiet. After singing folk songs for the visitor, the sharecropper stunned Gayn by
breaking into the Japanese version of a song of the Industrial Workers of the World (the I.W.W.
or "Wobblies"):
You will eat, bye and bye,
In that glorious land above the sky;
Work and pray, live on hay,
You'll get pie in the sky when you die.
[That's a lie!]
MARK GAYN,JAPAN DIARY, 114-15 (1948).
" Hideo Tanaka, Making the Constitution ofJapan, in DEMOCRATIZINGJAPAN, supra note 3, at
107, 108 (quoting Article 10 of the Potsdam Declaration).
' For a classic account of this period, see McNelly, supra note 3. The first priority of the
Japanese government was the preservation of the Emperor system, through which they could
maintain their power. The Japanese government's first offer during the peace negotiations
conditioned acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on the promise that the Emperor's prerogatives as a sovereign ruler not be compromised. The Allies rejected the offer. See id. at 76.
See id. at 100-01.
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power tried to brush aside the popular offerings and used their own
members to draft the constitution within the structure of informal
authority and accountability that had been at the heart of the prewar
system of government.' Those efforts will be sketched below in Section B. SCAP, rejecting the government's proposals for minimal
changes in the Meiji Constitution, considered various NGO drafts
and settled on one as a basic framework for its own draft. In the ensuing marathon negotiations over this draft between the Japanese
Government and SCAP, key provisions were weakened or removed.
Section C traces the evolution of the most important provisions concerning human rights and illustrates the efforts of conservatives to
minimize what they could not entirely prevent and shows the genesis
of much of the postwar litigation over the scope of constitutional protection for human rights.
The Japanese people as a whole, however, were excluded from the
process of constitution-making" Some groups called for a constitutional convention or a referendum on the SCAP inspired document
after it had been enacted by the last Imperial Diet under the Meji
Constitution. But, as Section D describes, these moves were blocked
by the conservative government, enabling the government and their
successors to argue later that the Constitution is an alien transplant
imposed by the occupation forces and does not reflect the true wishes
of the Japanese people.'
A.Private ConstitutionsWritten by Non-GovernmentalGroups
As was the case in the early 1880s, the possibility in 1945 of a
change of government provoked intense activity by individuals and
groups to create draft constitutions, stimulating political discussion
concerning the future of the Japanese state. Among others, proposals were put forward by the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the
Japan Anarchists League, the conservative Liberal Party, the conservative Progressive Party, and the Constitution Discussion Society."'

4'

See KOSKI, supra note 30, at 65.

' Censorship was tight under SCAP and General McArthur ordered that the scnsiti-v issue
of constitutional revision proceed in absolute secrecy. Newspapers occasionally published
leaked information, sometimes with the apparent blessing of SCAP. However, most Japanese
citizens did not learn how their Constitution had been drafted until 1951. when the translation
of the diary of Mark Gayn, who had covered Asia before the %ar and returned toJapan in 1945,
was published. See KOSEKI, supra note 39, at 1 Gayn provides one of the best accounts of the
period from 1945 to 1948 inJapan.

"ActualyJapanese conservatives did not begin to make this charge publicly until after the
execution of a security treaty betweenJapan and the United States, signif)ing the clear alignment of Japan uith the West in the Korean War. Emboldened by the United States' encouragement to rearm, the conservative parties began to attack the Constitution. which kept them
in power, as an alien document. The irony was not lost on the conservatives.
'0See Kossxt, supranote 30, at 26-50. The Constitution Discussion Society draft included an
article prohibiting military armaments forJapan. Only the personal draft of Takano lunsaburo.
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The most important of the private drafts was one written by the
Constitutional Research Association, a group of intellectuals and
writers lead by Takano Iwasaburo and Suzuki Yasuzo' Takano, an
old man at the end of the war, who had lived through the Freedom
and Popular Rights Movement and relinquished his post at Tokyo
Imperial University to become involved in educational programs for
workers, was a committed republican who advocated the abolition of
the emperor system. Suzuki, who was forced out of Kyoto Imperial
University after being convicted in the first case tried under the Peace
Preservation Law," studied constitutional history in prison and, upon
his release, wrote, as an independent scholar, a series of books on
constitutions and the history of the People's Rights Movement in the
Meiji Period. Although Suzuki advocated a republican government,
he thought that a transitional phase was essential and so argued for a
two-step approach beginning with a democracy retaining the emperor system followed by a reconsideration of this choice when the
country had gained experience with democracy. The Association accepted Suzuki's view and suggested an immediate revision of the
Meiji Constitution to be followed ten years later by the convening of a
constitutional assembly to draft a new constitution. The final draft
was closely modeled on the Weimar Republic Constitution, including
an extensive provision of social rights and the rights to existence,
which bears some similarities to the subsequent International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Under the Association's proposal, "[s]overeignty proceeds from the people," and the
Emperor became a symbolic figure, the source of honors and the
performer of state rituals.
SCAP, which received several private drafts from various civilian
organizations, gave the most attention to the draft offered by the
Constitutional Research Association. By mid-January of 1946, a detailed analysis of the Association's draft was prepared, which listed its
"outstanding liberal provisions," including the sovereignty of the
people, the conversion of the Emperor to a figurehead, protection of
workers, a referendum system, annual budgets approved by the Diet,

as distinct from the Constitutional Research Association's draft which he also authored, called
for the abolition of the emperor system and establishment of a republic. See id.at 38-39.
The forces opposed to the conservative government were by no means united or even
consistent in their positions. For example, Iwasa Sakutaro, chairman of the Japan Anarchists
league, offered on behalf of his organization a preamble dealing with human rights to the influential Constitutional Research Association, but then continued to urge the abolition of all
constitutional government. See id. at 36-37. That is, even anarchists, who opposed formal government, felt that establishing human rights as the basis of the Japanese state was so important
that they engaged in constitution drafting.
" See id. at 26-35 (describing Suzuki's and Takano's background as well as the process of
drafting the Association's private draft).
' This law was one of the most significant laws utilized to silence political dissidents. See
BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supranote 6, at 65-66, 68.
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and an audit bureau.' On February 4, 1946, after the collapse of
conservative attempts to draft a revised constitution, the Government
Section began crafting the presentJapanese Constitution with the Association's document as one of its tools.
B. PrivateConstitutionsWritten By Government Affiliated Individuals
Conservative politicians allied with the government also produced
drafts of the new Japanese Constitution. The principle writers of
such drafts were: Prince Konoe Fumimaro, prime minister three
times before the war and minister without portfolio in the first postwar Higashikuni cabinet, and Matsumoto Joji, a commercial law professor from Tokyo Imperial University, who served as director and
vice-president of the Manchurian Railway Company in Japanese controlled colonial Manchuria, as well as director general of the Legislative Bureau in the Yamamoto Cabinet and as Minister of Commerce.
Despite the linkages Prince Konoe and Matsumoto had developed
with the Japanese government, each of their efforts was really a private action without formal governmental authorization. This blurring
of the boundary between public and private realms for politically
powerful individuals, and the avoidance of clear responsibility by individuals and entities for governmental actions has been dubbed "collective irresponsibility" by the Japanese scholar Maruyama Masao. "
Konoe's effort to draft a newJapanese Constitution was aborted."
Konoe had persuaded the Lord of the Privy Seal, Kido Koichi, that he
should handle the revision of the Constitution in a capacity similar to
that of Ito Hirobumi as a "special appointee" of the Office of the
Privy Seal, that is, of the Emperor.' However, a power struggle ensued between Konoe, who had no formal office, and the new Shidehara Cabinet over control of constitutional reform which ended
when SCAP became concerned about Konoe's war record and suddenly repudiated Konoe's work on the Constitution.
A second and more important governmental effort was made by
an unofficial body created by the Shidehara Cabinet and chaired by
Matsumoto Joji. Technically, the Committee to Study Constitutional
Problems was created as a scholarly study group and was not charged
with constitutional revision. Nevertheless, after Konoe had been repudiated by MacArthur, the Committee's chairman, Matsumoto Joji,
on his own authority, turned the Committee toward drafting a reviSee KOSEKI, supra note 30, at 70.
See N-aruyama Masao, Gunkoku Shihaisha no SrishinPeitai [ The Mmtal Typa of the Rurn of a
MilitaristicNation], in GENDAI SEIJI NO SHISO TO KODO [THE THOUGHT AND ACTION OF MODERN
PoLI-cs] 88, 129 (revised ed. 1964).
SeeKOSEKI, supranote 30, at 16-21.
Konoe reported events to the Emperor and received a special appointment to the Office
of the Privy Seal. But he worked separately from and at cross purposes with the actual government, the Shidehara Cabinet. See id.at 10.
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sion of the Meii Constitution. Essentially, the result was the same as
the Meiji Constitution with only minor changes. One version, the socalled draft "A", was submitted to SCAP as the government's official
position." Subsequently, SCAP rejected the document and rapidly
drafted its own version.
The Japanese Government never truly understood the implications of the Potsdam Declaration and clung to both the Meiji Constitution and the Meiji system of power. Furthermore, the government
was unwilling to consider the drafts by other Japanese organizations,
let alone the wishes of the general public." The government's own
claim to legitimacy became tenuous. In fact, the country came close
to social upheaval when a general strike was proposed to bring down
the government, but SCAP intervened and banned collective action
to overthrow the old regime. Combined with SCAP's suppression of
union activity, the ban on collective action assured that the prewar
leaders would remain in power."
C. Evolution of the Human Rights Provisions
Once consideration of the constitution moved to the last Imperial
Diet in the middle of 1946, only minor changes were made to the
human rights sections.' The debate over the provisions occurred earN

The Committee, however, was established only by an informal understanding at a cabinet
meeting; this "government draft" was not based on any statute or government regulation; it was
never formally approved by the cabinet, nor announced by the Committee. Technically, the
draft was not even a public document. See id. at 65-66.
" The Matsumoto Committee, despite its formal charge as a scholarly research body, did no
research, except to seek material with which to discredit the Constitutional Research Association's proposal. The Matsumoto Committee attacked the proposal by claiming that the liberal
Weimar Constitution was responsible for the rise of Nazism. See id. at 62-63.
" The entry from Mark Gayn's diary for October 6, 1946 aptly reflects the sentiments of the
times. He begins by quoting the lead of his newspaper article for that day:
"Two hours after the Diet passed the new Constitution, officially labeled
[sic] as democratic, Japanese police today brutally broke up a demonstration of striking radio workers .... "
For today should be a great day for Japan-the formal inauguration
of a democratic state, based on respect for man's rights, a state in which no
heads are cracked for protesting against wastage of food in a year of hunger, a state in which the laws are put on the books to be enforced by the
government, and not sabotaged. It was perhaps symbolic of the great, publicity-made mirage which is the Japanese democracy that the sounds heard
on this day were not the cheers of a happy people but the groans of men
assaulted by the police.
GAYN, supra note 43, at 336-37.
On the United States' decision to "reverse course," see NAKAMURA, supra note 15, at 64-92.
In 1948, due to political pressure from Washington, SCAP reversed its policy in order to reinflate the Japanese economy quickly and to secure Japan as a stable base of operations for an
anticipated confrontation with the Soviet Union. SCAP quickly changed from promoting democracy and potentially far-reaching, social change to the support of the prewar military, industrial, and political leaders and their enterprises.
' This was not true with respect to the issue of pacifism, where the Ashida amendment to
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Her and was generally characterized by pressure from SCAP to expand rights and constant opposition from the government to limit
the expansion. In certain situations, SCAP itself was divided over
which rights should be included."I The resulting document reflects
an abstract compromise better understood as a compromise between
competing visions of a pluralistic democratic society and the Mejji
ideal, rather than a conflict between Western and Japanese values.
Although the SCAP draft placed human rights after the chapters
defining the Emperor's duties and requiring the renunciation of war,
the original draft provided for extensive rights;' thirty-one of the
Article 9, generally thought to be minor at the time of its adoption in the Diet debates, invited
the question whether the Article's sweeping prohibition against armed forces includes forces
for self-defense. This debate still rages on today. SeeJames E. Auer, Article Nine RaeunCatin of
War, inJAPANESE CONsTrrruoNAL LAw, supra note 5, at 69, 73; KOSEM, supra note 30. at 201

("But it is difficult to interpret the statement further as recognizing the maintenance of selfdefense potential and therefore as rationalizing the government's subsequent interpretation of
Article 9, thus making the Self-Defense Forces constitutional."). For a summary of academic
views on the transformation of the meaning of Article 9. without recourse to its legislative history, see Tomosuke Kasuya, ConstitutionalTransformation and the Ninth Article of the JapaneseCon-

stitution, in 3 GENDAI H6TETSUGAKu 41 (S. Tanaka ed., 2d ed. 1984), reprinted in 18 Lw IN
JAPAN 1 (Paul S. Taylor trans., 1986). For a comparison ofJapanese and American executive
powers, see Royer, supra note 13.
"' Within SCAP there were conflicts over the proper extent of constitutional protections.
For example, Beate Sirota, a young woman in SCAP's Government Section, drafted and fought
for comprehensive social welfare rights for women and children, drawing on the constitutions
and laws of the Weimar Republic and Scandinavia as models. Although the models used by Sirota were European, the contents of her proposal were what a number of Japanese feminists
and union leaders had unsuccessfully sought before the wcar. Her effort %%-as
overruled by her
superiors in SCAP on the grounds that such economic and social rights are not of constitutional
dimension. Later, during the Diet deliberations on the Constitution, ncwly elected female
members of the Lower House, the first women ever to serve in the Diet, offered an amendment
virtually identical to original provisions proposed by Sirota. Just as the American men in power
had done, the Japanese male legislators brushed aside the women's proposal. See KOSENI, supra
note 30, at 3. Gender bias and conflictingJapanese ideals of the state, not simply a confrontation of East and West, shaped the Constitution.
' Since the new Constitution was to be based on popular sovereignty, pacifism and human
rights, it may seem strange that the substantive provisions of tie Constitution begin with tie
Emperor. SeeKENP6 ch. I. This irony is often noted. Se, eg., OKUDAIRA, supra note 7. at 1-3.
Whether motivated by considerations of international law, such as the Hague Convention, or
merely practical political considerations, SCAP chose to organize tie new constitution along
the lines of the Meiji Constitution and to follow its amendment procedures. The close parallels
in structure are readily apparent
Chapter
One
Two
Three
Four

Meiii Constitution j SCAP Draft
The Emperor
The Emperor
Rights and Duties of Renunciation
of
Subiects
War
The Imperial Diet
Rights and Duties of
the People
The Ministers of The Diet
State and the Privy
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ninety-two articles granted individual rights. Ultimately, the presentday Constitution contained an extensive revision of criminal procedure rights,' and the following key human rights provisions obligating the government to ensure that vulnerable members of society
could live with dignity: ' Article 13, which secures respect for the indiSeven

Supplementary
Rules

Finance

Eight
Nine
Ten
Eleven
I

Local
Self-Government
Amendments
Supreme Law
Ratification
I_

I

Finance
Local
Self-Government
Amendments
Supreme Law
Supplementary
I Provisions

Since the fiction was that laws and official pronouncements made by the emperor, such as the
Meiji Constitution and imperial rescripts, were gifts from an infallible ruler, the postwar government faced a delicate political problem in choosing how to terminate the effectiveness of
such documents. After considering petitions to the emperor to cancel the Imperial Rescript on
Education or to replace it with a new imperial rescript suitable for a democratic state, the Diet
simply dispensed with such an approach and passed a resolution declaring the imperial document null and void. See HORIO, supra note 38, at 131-37. It is often speculated that the Emperor Hirohito's cooperation in the adoption of the Constitution was the price demanded by
SCAP for escaping prosecution as a war criminal.
0 See KENPO arts. 31-40. A detailed discussion of this topic falls outside of the limits of this
paper. But conflict over the enforcement of the constitution's provisions concerning the rights
of the accused and the subsequent recourse to claims based on the guarantees in international
human rights treaties, especially Articles 7, 9, 10 and 14 of the ICCPR, to restore or argument
the protections of the constitution, parallels the litigation over the enforcement of other human rights in postwarJapan. See infra notes 246-303 and accompanying text.
" Other key provisions provide for democratic elections based on universal suffrage, see
KENP6 arts. 15(3), freedom of thought and conscience, see id. at art. 19, and the separation of
church and state, see id. at art. 20. These rights also have had a complicated history in postwar
Japan. See, e.g., Kanao etal v. Hiroshima Election Comm'n, 39 MINSHiI 5, 1100 (Sup. Ct,July
17, 1985) (holding that misapportionment of voting districts is unconstitutional, but providing
no remedy), translatedin BEER & ITOH, 1970 THROUGH 1990, supra note 8, at 394; Kurokawa v.
Chiba Prefecture Election Comm'n, 30 MINSHIi 3, 223 (Sup. CL, Apr. 14, 1976), translated in
BEER & ITOH, 1970 THROUGH 1990, supranote 8, at 355 (same). For a discussion of the erosion
of church and state doctrine, see DAVID M. O'BRIEN WITH YASUO OHKOSHi, To DREAM OF
DREAMS: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS INPOSTWARJAPAN 185-187 (1996).
Some commentators emphasize the group nature ofJapanese society and the lack of consciousness of individual rights. Yet, the rights in the human rights section of the Constitution
were, to a significant extent, what some if not many of theJapanese had been seeking since the
Meiji Restoration. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Beer, The Public Welfare Standard and Freedom of Expression in Japan,in THE CONSTITUTION OFJAPAN: ITS FIRST TvENTY YEARS, supra note 3, at 210-12;
John 0. Haley, Introduction: Legal vs. Social Controls, 17 LAWV INJAPAN 1 (1984); Ken R. Minami,
Note, Japanese Thought and Western Law: A TangentialView of the JapaneseBengoshi and theJapanese
American Attorney, 8 LoY. LA. INT'L & COMP. Lj. 301 (1986). There is also abundant literature
on a distinctive legal culture which favors the avoidance of direct confrontation. See, e.g., Takeyoshi Kawashima, DisputeResolution in ContemporaryJapan, in LAWv INJAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER
IN ACHANGING SOCIETY 41 (Arthur T. von Mehren ed., 1963). But see Hideo Tanaka, Note, The
Role of Law inJapaneseSociety: Comparisons with the West 19 U.B.C. L. REV. 375 (1985) (E. Siedenticker trans., 1976); Setsuo Miyazawa, Taking Kawashima Seriously:A Review ofJapaneseResearch on
JapaneseLegal Consciousness andDisputingBehavior, 21 L. & SOC'Y REV. 219 (1987).
But the is also severe criticism of the facile notion thatJapanese have a weak sense of legal consciousness. See, e.g., Frank K. Upham, Weak Legal Consciousness as Invented Tradition, in MIRROR
OF MODERNITY: INVENTED TRADITIONS OF MODERNJAPAN 48 (Stephen Vlastos ed., 1998). The
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vidual and guarantees the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; Article 14, which declares that all people are equal under the
law; Article 24, which provides for equal rights for husbands and
wives; Article 25, which secures the right to a minimum standard of
wholesome and cultured living; and Article 26, which secures the
right to equal education.'
Special consideration, however, should be given to the narrowing
of rights in three areas during the drafting process, specifically the
introduction of the "public welfare" limitation on individual rights,
the subtle retraction of protection given to aliens, and the failure to
fully extend rights to women or illegitimate children. Although, the
Japanese courts never compare the actual provisions of the Constitution with those in the SCAP draft, the comparison indicates the policy
objectives of the Japanese political leaders and provides background
to areas of the law that have driven important litigation under the
constitution and, more recently, under the ICCPR1Y'
Articles 12 and 13 of the Constitution contain "public welfare"
clauses which have been interpreted by the Supreme Court to impose
limits on an individual's rights. ' These articles provide:
Article 12

The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people,
who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and
shall always be
responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare.

movement for women's rights, for example, grew out of the Freedom and Popular Rights
Movement. See SHARON L SIEvERs, FLOWERS IN S.%LT: THE BEGLNNLN S OF FEMswIiST
CONSCIOUSNESS IN MODERN JAPAN (1983); REF.EC'IONS OF THE WAY TO THE GALLOWS, sua'a
note 13. For an account of the condition faced by female industrial workers and the evolution
of their consciousness of their human dignity, see E. PATRICIA TSURUMI,
FACTORY GIRLS:
WOMEN IN THE THREAD MILLS OF MiJIJAPAN (1990). But seJ. MARK AMSETER, ODD MET:Ls
INJAPANTESE HISTORY (1996).
' SeeKENP6 arts. 13, 14,24,26.
See infra notes 200-245 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the 'public
welfare" provisions); see infra notes 277-303 and accompanying text (discussing litigation under
the ICGPR).
See KENP6 at arts. 12-13. These two clauses emerged as major limitations on individual
rights in the postwar judicial decisions. Two other, less often utilized, public welfare clauses
appear in the Constitution to limit freedom of residence and occupation, and property rights:
Article 22
(1) Every person shall have freedom to choose and change his residence
and choose his occupation to the extent that it does not interfere ith the
public welfare.
Article 29
(1) The rights to own or to hold property is inviolable.
(2) Property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with the public
welfare....
Id. at arts. 22,29.
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Article 13
All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to
life liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it
does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other government affairs."8
The explicit balancing of individual concerns against the demands of communal living is a far greater limitation than was proposed by SCAP.' The comparable provisions of the SCAP draft were:
Article 9
The people ofJapan are entitled to enjoyment without interference
with all fundamental human rights.
Article 10
The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to
the people of Japan result from the age-old struggle to be free.
They have survived the exacting test for durability in the crucible of
time and experience, and are conferred upon this and future generations in sacred trust, to be held for all time inviolate.
Article 11
The freedoms, rights and opportunities enunciated by this Constitution are maintained by the eternal vigilance of the people and involve an obligation on the part of the people to prevent their abuse
and to employ them always for the common good.
Article 12
The feudal system of Japan shall cease. All Japanese by virtue of
their humanity shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness within the limits of the general
welfare shall be the supreme consideration of all law and of all govemmental action. 0
Thus, the obligation of the people in Article 11 of the SCAP version
to be active agents combating social dysfunction and promoting the
common good was transformed into a legal limitation on individual
rights.
There seems to be no clear evidence for the source of this change
which is particularly puzzling since the public welfare clauses are ar-

Id. at arts. 12, 13.
For a distinction between the concept of the "general welfare" in the U.S. Constitution
and the "public welfare" clauses in the Japanese Constitution, see BEER, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION, supra note 37, at 152.
'0 SCAP Draft arts. 9, 10, 11, 12, quoted in KYOKO INOUE, MAcARTHUR'S JAPANESE
CONSTITUTION: A LINGUISTICAND CULTURAL STUDYOF ITS MAKING 305 (1991).
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guably some of the most important provisions of the Constitution in
postwar constitutional litigation.' The Meiji Constitution contained
numerous provisions which permitted the limitation of the constitutional fights of an individual by mere statutes, using phrases such as
"according to the provisions of law" and "provided for in the law" and
"within the limits of the law." ' The present day Constitution explicitly balances individual rights with public welfare but does not specify
how the parameters of that limitation are determined. The judiciary,
with its new powers ofjudicial review, would have to take up the task.'
This shift should have been an improvement on the prewar system of
legislative control over the limits of individual rights,"' but the postmar
judiciary has adopted an extreme deference to the policy decisions of
the Diet and consequently the significance of the shift has been
greatly diminished.'
Following the War, a key constitutional issue to be determined was
who the Constitution would protect.: After the Meiji Restoration, all
people in Japan and its colonies of Taiwan and Korea were encouraged to consider themselves equally "Japanese," in the sense that they
were all members of the nation and owed it a duty of loyalty. However, this equality of allegiance did not confer equality of rights. Under the family registration system, the key institution for the recognition of legal citizenship, Japanese citizens were segregated to
distinguish clearly between people of Japanese ancestry and those of
colonial origin. More than two million people of colonial origin,
primarily of Korean descent, were in Japan at the end of the war.
They had been brought to Japan as slave labor to work in factories
and mines, or had been forced to immigrate to Japan in search of
work because of Japan's colonial economic policies. The postwar
question of who would be within the reach of the new Constitution
was strongly influenced by the presence in Japan of these people of
7 See, e-g., Maid, The Constitution ofJapan,supra note 5, at 51 (There is no account of how
and why the public welfare doctrine was introduced into the Constitution."). Kades %,as one of
the main drafters of the SCAP proposal. See id. at n.18 (quoting a conversation %ithCharles L
Eades, former Deputy Chief, GHQ SCAP).
For example, Articles 22 and 29 of the Meiji Constitution read as follows:
Article 22
Japanese subjects shall have the liberty of abode and of changing abode
within the limits of the law.
Article 29
Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of the law, enjoy the liberty of
speech, writing, publication, public meetings and associations.
Mnji KENP6 arts. 22, 29.
See KENP6 art. 81.
SeeBEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESION, supra note 37, at 152.
See Ford, supra note 4, at 26 (discussing the traditional approach taken by the Japanese
Supreme Court of restricting fundamental human rights "as a matter of course' when necessary
for the "public welfare").
6 See KOSEFU, supra note 30, at 114-15 (discussing the differences betwen the SCAP and
Japanese draft constitutions with regard to which citizens were protected by die Constitution).
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colonial origin.
The SCAP draft addressed this issue in two ways: by explicitly extending protection to aliens and by using the somewhat vague and
open-ended term "the people of Japan" in its provisions. The SCAP
"Subcommittee on Human Rights,"" which produced the original
thirty-one human rights provisions, proposed the following:
Article 13
All Natural persons are equal before the law. No discrimination
shall be authorized or tolerated in political, economic, educational
or domestic relations on account of race, creed, sex, social status,
caste or national origin.
Article 16
Aliens shall be entitled to the equal protection of the law. When
charged with any offense they are entitled to the assistance of their
diplomatic representatives and of interpreters of their own choosing.7
The final version proposed by SCAP eliminated the detailed right
and retained the general one, as was the case with other protections,
such as those for children and pregnant women.' SCAP's final draft
" It may be humbling for lawyers and legal scholars to consider that although this subcommittee produced a carefully drawn draft, no member of this three member committee was
trained in law. See id. at 86-87 (profiling the members of the subcommittee). However, all
three members had traveled extensively and lived in various countries in the turbulent period
before World War iI, and two of the three had lived in Japan before the war and knew well the
treatment of human rights under the Meiji Constitution. See id.
"' SCAP Draft art. 15, 16, quoted in KOSEKI, supra note 30, at 87. There is a striking similarity
between these provisions and those of the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), which Japan ratified in 1979. For example, the ICCPR includes:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
Article 14

3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall
be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
C] To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand
or speak the language used in court.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR], adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, arts. 26, 14(3)(a),(f).
" See supra note 61 for a discussion of a split within SCAP over certain rights, including
those for women and children
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read:
Article 13
All natural persons are equal before the law. No discrimination
shall be authorized or tolerated in political, economic or social relations on account of race, creed, sex, social status, caste, or national
origin.
Article 14
Aliens shall be entitled to the equal protection of law."
This broad inclusion of aliens, that is, residents in Japan of Korean and Taiwanese ancestry, within the Constitution's protection was
eliminated in a three-step process. First, the Japanese government
prevailed during its negotiations with SCAP in a seemingly minor
change in the proposed language of Article 13 from SCAP's "all natural persons" to the government's formula of "all the people" (kolumin)." At the same time, the government completely eliminated
SCAP's Article 14 and its blanket protection of aliens. The second
step came later when the meaning of the term "the people" (holumin) was defined by statute to mean person with Japanese citizenship.' The third step was taken six years after the adoption of the
Constitution when the Japanese government, relying on Article 2A of
the Peace Treaty with the Allied Powers, issued a notice through the
Director General of the Civil Affairs Bureau nine days before the
Peace Treaty became effective in 1952. The circular announced that
all Koreans, including those residing in Japan, were summarily
stripped of Japanese nationality; no choice was permitted." The
question surfaced as to whether the Constitution afforded any protection at all for aliens, including these long-term resident aliens.
The present Constitution provides in pertinent part:
Article 14
All of the people [kokumin] are equal under the law and there shall
be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.'

SCAP Draft art. 13, 14, quoted in KOSEKI, supra note 30. at 114. Article 13 includes further
text not reproduced here.
" The most extensive changes of this sort occurred on March 4-5, 1946 in the marathon
negotiations over the final Japanese text to be submitted to the Cabinet. Ajapanese govrnment representative, Sato Tatsuo, succeeded in replacing SCAP's translation of "the Japanese
People" from lthonjinmin ith the phrase Nippon hUkumin. Sw id. at 121-22.
See i at 122 (explaining that Sato's success in "Japanizing the SCAP draft later opened
the way to a statutory definition of kokumin).
TtIE IMPACT
See YuJI IwAsAWA, INTERNATIOAL LAIW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND JAPAMESE LA%%s:
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw ONJAPANESE AW 130-31 (1998).
KENP6 art. 14(1).
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Although there have been attempts to understand such changes
in the negotiations as cultural misunderstandings or failures of linguistic ability, such an interpretation is unconvincing.' Rather, from
the very outset the Japanese government strove to limit legal protections for the basic human rights of non-Japanese.6 This policy resulted in decades of litigation in the postwar era.
The human rights of another disfavored group in prewar Japan,
children born out of wedlock, were affected by a conflict inside
SCAP. The Civil Rights Committee fought arduously for an article
that would explicitly extend constitutional protection to these individuals. The proposed article stated:
In all spheres of life, laws shall be designed for the protection and
extension of social welfare; and of freedom, justice and democrac..... To this end the Diet shall enact legislation which shall: Pro-

tect and aid expectant and nursing mothers, promote infant and
child welfare, and establish just rights for illegitimate and adopted
children, and for the underprivileged.0
According to the chief of the Government Section, General Whitney,
this "minutia of social legislation" did not merit inclusion into the
Constitution. Thus, the Article did not appear in the SCAP final draft
or in the final version of the Constitution. With Japan's ratification
'
See INOUE, supra note 70, at 266 ("[The Americans] had little knowledge ofJapanese history and culture and did not speak Japanese. Consequently they were unaware of the vast cultural and linguistic gap that divided the two sides."). For a severe criticism of Kyoko Inoue's
conclusions that cultural differences and linguistic incapacities caused these changes, see J.
Mark Ramseyer, Together Duped.- How Japanese and Americans Negotiated a Constitution Without
Communicating,23 LAW INJAPAN 123, 126 (1990) (book review) ("Rather than a story about the
various social, political, and economic incentives that the negotiators on each side faced, she
tells one about two undifferentiated populations: two nations, two societies of several million
citizens each, two groups of people that were homogeneous within themselves-yet utterly different from each other. They were two group that never met. Duped together, she implies, they
passed a Constitution in substantive silence.... It is [a] story that describes neither many
Americans I know nor many Japanese."). The criticism is justified. One of the major negotiators for the Japanese government, Sato Tasuo, is reported to have said that it was the policy of
MatsumotoJoji, the author of draft offered by the government, to first remove the "outer prickles from the chestnut and then peel away the bitter outer skin" of SCAP's draft constitution.
This remark is believed to refer to the stripping away of the human rights provisions and, in
particular, the human rights of aliens. See Amakawa Alira & Furukawa Atsushi, Shinhenp6 no
seiritsu:seiteikatei to samazama na kdsJ [The Establishment of the New Constitution: The Making Process
and Various Proposals], in 1 SENGO NIHON NO GENTEN: SENRYO NO GENZAI [THE ORIGIN OF
POSTWARJAPAN: CONTEMPORARYVIEW OF THE OCCUPATION ERA] 168 (Sodei Rinjiro & Takemae
Eiji eds., 1992).
'
See KOSEKI, supranote 30, at 119-20 (describing the effort of Sato Tatsuo, acting as proxy
for Matsumoto Joji in marathon negotiations on March 4-5, 1946, to eliminate entirely from the
constitution the provision for protection of foreigners).
" See id. at 87-89 (describing the conflict between SCAP's human rights subcommittee anti
the coordinating committee); see also supra note 61.
"' SCAP Subcommittee Draft, quoted in KOSEKI, supra note 30, at 88.
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of the ICCPR in 1979, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1985, and the Convention
of the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1994, the question of the state's
obligation towards mothers and children born out of wedlock would
reemerge.'
In short, the negotiating process between SCAP and the Japanese
government revealed consistent strong opposition of the government
against the establishment of human rights. Even within SCAP there
were clashes over the necessary scope of rights: lower ranking personnel, who spoke Japanese and had lived in prewar Japan, pressed
for greater protections and senior officers sometimes overruled such
proposals. The resulting text of the Constitution is silent on the
rights of groups disfavored by the government, most notably aliens
and illegitimate children. Women gained nominal equality, but
without economic and social rights to make that formal equality
meaningful. The final document reflects an abstract compromise, not
necessarily between Western andJapanese values, but rather between
a vision of an open, pluralistic democratic society and the Meiji ideal
of government. The precise contours of the constitutionally guaranteed rights would have to be determined by the judiciary.
D.Denialof a PopularReferendum on the Constitution
by the Government ofJapan
Once the new Constitution came into effect, its fate %as left in the
hands of those who had strenuously opposed it. More importantly,
the revision of the new Constitution, the second-step in the adoption
of the Constitution urged by the Constitutional Research Association
and required by SCAP's nominal master the Far Eastern Commission
(FEC), was also left in the hands of the incumbent conservative government. On January 3, 1947, Prime Minister Yoshida received a
letter from General MacArthur offering the Japanese people
another chance to amend the Constitution, this time without
the intervention of the Occupation forces through a popular
referendum.' The letter reveals the concern of the foreign powers
that the values in the new Constitution be freely accepted by the
Japanese and provided a clear opportunity to overcome the undemocratic process of making the constitution. MacArthur wrote "the Allied Powers feel that there should be no future doubt that the constitution expresses both the free and considered will of the Japanese
people." Prime Minister Yoshida's response on January 6, 1947 wras

See infra notes 277-282; 286-287 and accompan)ing text.
See KosEKi, supra note 30, at 243-54.
The letter stated in full:
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
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laconic in the extreme.'
In fact, Yoshida did nothing. News of the Far East Commission
decision to allow a popular referendum did not leak to the Japanese
public until March 1948, and momentum for revision did not grow
until August 1948, when the Yoshida cabinet fell and was replaced by
the Ashida cabinet. Several revision proposals were made by private
groups," but the pressure for revision dissipated when the Ashida
cabinet fell suddenly due to a bribery scandal involving, among others, Prime Minister Ashida himself. Shortly thereafter, Yoshida Shigeru returned to power, and as the proposed two-year deadline approached, Shigeru lied to the Diet about receiving a proposal from
the FEC allowing for revision of the Constitution.'
Simply stated, the Japanese government did not want to go to its
people for a referendum on the new Constitution. It was clear at that
time that a majority strongly supported the Constitution,' and the
In connection with their consideration of political developments in
Japan during the course of the past year, the Allied Powers have decided,
in order to insure to the Japanese people full and continuing freedom of
opportunity to reexamine, review, and if deemed necessary amend the new
constitution in the light of experience gained from its actual operation,
that between the first and second years of its effectivity it should again be
subjected to their formal review and that of the Japanese Diet. If they
deem it necessary at that time, they may additionally require a referendum
or some other appropriate procedure for ascertaining directly Japanese
opinion with respect to it. In other words, as the bulwark of future Japanese freedom, the Allied Powers feel that there should be no future doubt
that the constitution expresses both the free and considered will of the
Japanese people.
These continuing rights of review are of course inherent, but I am
nevertheless acquainting you with the position thus taken by the Allied
Powers in order that you may be fully informed in the premises.
With cordial best wishes for the new year,
Most Sincerely,
Douglas MacArthur
Letter from Douglas MacArthur, General in U.S. Army, to Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister
to Japan (Jan. 3, 1947), reprintedin KOSEKI, supra note 30, at 243.
Yoshida replied:
My dear General:
I acknowledge receipt of your letter of January 3rd, and have carefully noted the contents.
Yours very sincerely,
(signed) Shigeru Yoshida.
Letter from Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister of Japan, to Douglas MacArthur, General in
U.S. Army (Jan. 6, 1947), reprintedin KOSEKI, supra note 30, at 245.
" See id at 248-50 (discussing proposals by the Public Law Forum and the Constitutional
Research Committee of Tokyo University).
" Prime Minister Yoshida responded to a question from the House Foreign Affairs Committee as follows: "I know nothing about a decision by the Far Eastern Commission. I am not aware
of it, but the Government has no intention at the present of amending the Constitution. And if
the Ashida Cabinet planned to revise the Constitution, I have not heard about it." Id. at 250.
As one scholar pointed out:
[Miany other prewarJapanese, from intellectuals and journalists to factory
laborers and tenant farmers, had accumulated important experiences with
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best that the government conservatives could hope for would be
rather minor, technical changes in the text. Moreover, a public
showing of support for the Constitution through a referendum would
have rendered a substantial, conservative revision in the future more
difficult by removing the claim that the Constitution is an alien, imposed document. Given the overwhelming support for the new Constitution, the conservatives elected to wait.
The momentum inside the FEC to press for a review of the Constitution by the Japanese people was also lost as the United States government prepared in the fall of 1948 to take a "reverse course" and
rapidly stabilize the Japanese political situation and the economy."
The policy entailed the purge of leftists, suppression of trade unions,
dropping prosecutions of most prewar leaders for war crimes, and
curtailment of the break-up of the prewar industrial combines (zaibatsu). Australia, an ally, pressed for the implementation of the FEC's
plan of the second stage of the two-step process for establishing the
Constitution.' This second stage, a constitutional convention run by
Japanese under a democratic regime, and hoped for by the Constitutional Research Association, never occurred due to the opposition of
both American andJapanese conservatives.
Once the Occupation ended in 1952, certain conservative forces
attempted to revise the Constitution?' The trigger for such a revision
was an effort in 1954 to amend the Constitution in order to make it
compatible with the 1953 Mutual Security Assistance Act (MSA)
agreement between the United States and Japan. Conservatives, however, who have utilized the name LDP since the merger in 1955 of the
two major conservative parties, also sought to promote their vision of
the family reminiscent of the form imposed by the Meji government.
Likewise, these conservatives sought restoration of the position of the
Emperor. This conservative movement waxed and aned for over
forty years, but never succeeded in passing any amendment. With the
present disorder in the Japanese society and economy, however, the
conservative campaign for constitutional revision appears to be gain-

democratic practice from the late nineteenth century to the 1930s. The reforms of the Allied occupation enabled such activists to regroup and join
hands with novices.... They vastly expanded the constituendes supporting
a democratic and egalitarian political system.
kP
ANDREW GORDON, THE VAGES OF AFFLUENCE" LABOR AND iANAGE.IEN'I IN POSTnYR J.A

5

(1998).

9 For a detailed of account of the reverse course policy, see NARAMURA. supr note 15,at 6492; see also SCHALER, supra note 7, at 12-24 (providing an account in English).
"See SCHALLER, supra note 7, at 32 ("Even friendly states such as Great Britain. Australia.
the Philippines, and New Zealand resented the lack of consultation and te absence of military
and economic controls... envisioned in the American Plan.').
" For a comprehensive account of the movement to revise the Constitution, see WAT.NALBE
OSAMt,

NIHONKOKU KENPO "KAISEI" SHI [THE HISTORY OF THE "REISION

CONsTnI-unON] 1

(1987).

OF THE JAPNESE
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ing momentum once again."
In the postwar era, two possible routes have been open to conservatives, revision by "installments""' and revision by reinterpretation.
In the former, the government simply acts in incremental steps as if
the Constitution has been amended, allowing small changes until
gradually the meaning of the Constitution as a practical matter is altered, even if the text is not. The key to the success of this incremental approach is the absence of a judicial response to the gradual
encroachments. The latter strategy, in contrast, depends entirely on
an active contribution by the judiciary to transform the meaning of
the Constitution. The implementation of these strategies did not go
unchallenged; waiting in the wings were numerous persons willing to
bring lawsuits in order to seek effective implementation of the new
Constitution.
III. JUDICAL RESPONSES TO THE CONSTITUTION
The new Japanese Constitution gives the power of judicial review
to the Supreme Court,"' which in turn delegates that power to the inferior courts."' Judicial review of governmental actions was not an established tradition under the former Meiji Constitution. As for the
judiciary itself, the major innovation made by the Occupation was an
organizational one, namely to shift the judiciary out from under the
direct control of the Ministry of Justice and to make it an autono" For the attempts in the early 1990s to revise the Constitution, see MORI HIDEKI ET AL.,
KENPO "KAISEI" HIHAN [CRITICISM OF CONSTITUTIONAL "REviSION"] (1994). It is hard to convey
to readers unfamiliar with Japan the extreme positions of Japanese conservatives pressing for
revision and their pervasiveness. Human rights are repeatedly misrepresented in respectable
publications as a license for violent self-gratification. At present, there are many articles in
mainstream newspapers and journals criticizing the human rights provisions of the Constitution
as the primary cause of various social problems, such as the recent crimes by a fourteen year old
boy in the city of Kobe who beheaded a young boy and assaulted two little girls, killing one of
them. Such claims may seem nonsensical to people who have never lived in Japan, but these
claims and others of this type are regularly drummed into the minds of the Japanese public by
the government and by government affiliated commentators. The effect is not negligible.
Japanese sociologist Yoshio Sugimoto explained the term "installments":
These step-by-step shifts in the interpretation of the same text reflect
whatJapanese call nashikuzushi, the pragmatic strategy that many Japanese
power-holders at various levels use to adapt gradually to changing circumstances, The term nashikuzushi originally meant payments by installments,
but in this context [Article 9] it implies players achieve their final goal by
making a series of small changes in the meaning of key terms in a document. The technique does not call for alteration of the text itself. The
point is not so much the validity of the changing interpretations as the almost imperceptible way in which they have been brought about, little by
little.
YOSHIO SUGIMOTO, AN INTRODUCTION TOJAPANESE SOCIEIY 252 (1997).
"' See KENP6 art. 81 ("The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with the power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.").
See id. at art. 77(3) ("The Supreme Court may delegate the power to make rules for inferior courts to such courts.").
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mous branch of government. At the personnel level, however, no
significant changes occurred. Unlike the business and political
communities, the judiciary was never purged to remove from positions of authority individuals with dubious records during the %,ar or
obvious opposition to the new Constitution.
Moreover, as a result of the judiciary's personnel practices, the
prewar generation, educated and raised under the Meii Constitution,
has been disproportionately represented on the Supreme Court." '
With this background, the judiciary faced a difficult challenge in carrying out its new role under the Constitution in a rapidly-changing
Japanese society. In fact the Court has adopted a policy of extreme
deference to the legislative and executive branches, so much so that
the Japanese legal system, in effect, has returned to that of the Meiji
period where laws dictated the content of the Constitution. Since,
the judiciary has such a consistent record of supporting the government's positions on rejecting challenges to the government, it is not
surprising that questions arise concerning the judiciary's independence.
A. Independence of theJapaneseJudician,
It is not easy to assess whether the judiciary, considered as a
whole, has been subjected to undue political influence. Many different types ofjudges, clerks and administrators work within the system.
Furthermore, the Constitution provides for a certain degree of political penetration into the judiciary. The Emperor appoints the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court on the recommendation of the Cabinet,"' and the Cabinet appoints the other fourteen Justices of the Supreme Court."° In addition, the Justices' appointments to the Court
are subject to periodic review by the general electorate."u Still, the
constitutional design conspicuously links the Supreme Court with the
political leadership of the country and the electorate, in contrast with
the prewar schema, in which the judiciary wras embedded in the Min-

1"

As of 1995, no one born after 1929 had ever served on the Supreme Court, seeJohn 0.

Haley,Judid!dIndependenaeinJapanRevisited, 25 L.W INJAPAN 1, 14 (1995), which means that. at
least until their mid-teenage years, the Justices had grown up and been educated under the
Meiji system. Until 1990, no Justices on the Court had received a legal education in post-ar
Japan under the present democratic Constitution. See id.
SeeKENT5 art. 6(2).
10 Seeid.atart. 79(1).
1
This electoral review is, however, not surprisingly, a purely formal exercise as the general
population knows little about individualjustices. See Hideo Tanaka, Saidd sailanshono stabanhan
no ninmei to kokumin shinsa [The Appointment of Supreme CourtJustims and The PopularRe=z, of
Appointments], Saikosaibansho, 4 H6GAKU SEMINA, SGtTOKUSHUi SHIRIZU 82 (1977), reprinted in
11 LAW INJAPAN: AN ANNuAL 33, 33-34 (Kgji Ishimura trans., 1978). Tanaka's article provides a
good summary in English of the appointment process.
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istry of Justice.' 7° Nevertheless, the present constitutional arrangement poses a central question; what is the proper degree of political
influence on the courts? Because the Supreme Court has affirmed
the constitutionality of all but a handful of laws and the overwhelming number of administrative actions brought before it since 1947,
and the LDP has held almost unbroken control of the Diet and the
executive, critics have argued that the LDP covertly controls the judiciary." The tightening of political control dates from the late 1960s
in response to growing signs ofjudicial willingness to rule against the
government. A purge of judges through direct intervention by the
LDP and a subsequent strengthening of indirect controls through the
increased power of a centralized judicial bureaucracy raise serious
concerns about the independence of the Japanese judiciary from
LDP control.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Japanese society was in turmoil
as citizens questioned the nation's social priorities, recognizing the
societal costs evident under LDP rule." As a result, both individuals
and citizen groups turned to the judiciary for redress of grievances
against the government. The following are examples of some of the
well known cases of that era: the Big Four pollution suits,"' the Niigata
Minamata Disease Case,"' the Yokkaichi Air Pollution Case,"' the Itai-Itai
Disease Case,"' and the Minamata Disease Case,"' a series of suits
brought by Professor Ienaga Saburo challenging the censorship of
school textbooks by the Ministry of Education; ' and a number of la"' See infra notes 159-199 and accompanying text for a series of arguments that the judiciary
is too closely tied to the government.
' SeeJ. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANcES M. ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 17879 (1993) ("In substance, Japanese judges are agents of LDP principals; in practice, LDP principles treatJapanese agents much as principal-agent theory suggests. LDP leaders use their direct control over judicial appointments and indirect control over the Secretariat to shape judicial decisions.").
" See Lawrence W. Beer, Freedom of Expression: The Continuing Revolution, in JAPANESE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 221, 231 (detailing citizen challenges to government
rules).
"0 These four cases were decided in the period from 1971-73. The plaintiffs prevailed in
each case due in part to significant innovations by the judiciary in the area of tort law. See
FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWARJAPAN (1987); JULAN GRESSER ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INJAPAN 55 (1981); Shiro Kawashima, A Survey of Environmental Law and
Polily in Japan, 20 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 231, 242 (1995).
. SeeJudgment of 29 September 1971, Niigata [District Court], 22 KAMINSH5i, Nos. 9 & 10,
Extra No. at 1; see also UPHAM, supra note 110, at 35 (discussing the case); GRESSER, supra note
110, at 65.
. SeeJudgment of 24 July 1972, Tsu [District Court], 672 HANJI 30; see also GRESSER, supra
note 110, at 105.
...
SeeJudgment of 30 June 1971, Toyamna [District Court], 635 HANREIJIH6 17, affdJudgment of 9 August 1972, Nagoya High Court, 674 HANREIJIH6 25; see also GRESSER, supra note
110, at 55-56.
"' See Judgment of 20 March 1973, KUMAMOTO [District Court], 696 HANJI 15; see also
Upham, supra note 110, at 34, GRESSER, supra note 110, at 65.
.. See, e.g., Ienaga v. Ministry of Education, 604 HANREIJIH6 29(Tokyo Dist. Ct., July 17,
1970). In 1951, the conservative ruling elite in Japan began to attack the education reforms
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bor rights cases."6 The high water mark of this trend occurred in
1966 with the Supreme Court's decision in the Tolgo CentralPost Office
Case."7 This case dealt with the particularly sensitive question of the
rights of public employees to engage in collective bargaining and to
express political opinions other than by voting in public elections. In
the postwar era, laws like the Public Enterprise Labor Relations Law
(PERL), under which workers were forbidden to encourage fellow
laborers to leave their work for activities, such as a union rally, sharply
curtailed these important rights. In the Tokyo CentralPost Office Case,
postal union leaders, who incited workers to attend a rally during
working hours in anticipation of upcoming wage negotiations, were
convicted under PERL. Faced with a challenge to the restriction on
free speech, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
relevant provision of PERL, but also issued a set of interpretive guidelines to the high court on remand with which the court was to reconsider the justifiability of the union leaders' actions."' The Supreme
instigated by SCAP during the Occupation in order to "correct the excesses" of post-war democracy. By 1952, Prime Minister Yoshida announced that the cultivation of patriotism must become the cornerstone of education in Japan. In 1953, the U.S. administration sent AXssistant
Secretary of State Robertson to review the Japanese government's intentions and he approved
of the plan to reorient the education s)stem towards the rearmament of Japan and patriotic
education in place of so-called peace education. Then Vice-President Nixon echoed this decision, declaring the peace Constitution a major mistake of American post-ar policy. Sur Horio,
supra note 37, at 146-48. In 1954-55, the government moved quickly to dismantle key components of the postwar reform, such as local control of schools through elected school boards and
the reimposition of a centralized system controlled by the Ministry of Education. Numerous
groups opposed what was perceived to be the reconstruction of the prew%,ar education system.
The government resorted to force, bringing the special riot police (ludJtal) into the Diet to control the uproar over the legislation to replace locally elected school boards with government
appointed ones. That legislation, the Law Concerning the Management and Operation of Local Administration, passed by a narrow margin, but companion legislation establistsing a tightening of censorship of textbooks was soundly defeated. But by 1958, the Ministry of education
simply imposed the scheme of the defeated textbook legislation by administratihe guidance.
that is without a statutory basis. The new system would spawn numerous la%suits, including
those brought by Professor Ienaga over the censorship of his history textbook. Se zd. at 171212. But see BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 37, at 243-45. 264-70 (arguing that restraints on freedom of expression more likely due to unintentional cause than intentional censorship).
. For an in-depth discussion of the freedom of expression of workers, set BEER. FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION, supra note 37, at 205-39.
'See Toyama et al. v.Japan, 20 KESHi 8, 901 (Sup. CL, G.B., OCL 26, 1966) [hereinafter
Tokto Central Post Office Case], translated in LWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSiII ITOti, TtIE
CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OFJAPAN, 1970: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961-70, 85
(1978) [hereinafter BEER& ITOH, SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961-701; Set also BEEP.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 37, at 232 (providing a useful synopsis of the decision).
Subsequent citations to this case will consist of the popular name followed by an appropriate
citation to the BEER & ITOH translation. Other cases with English translations will be sinilarl
cited. In circumstances where no translation into English is available, the correctJapanese case
citation will be provided alongside a secondary source.
"' The Court reasoned that, "[T]he fundamental rights of workers engaging in public services or in public enterprises involve restrictions different from that of private enterprises only
according to the nature of their duties." BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIO., supra note 37, at 232.
The Court ruled that courts must consider distinctions between 'types of work, between 1gi6i-
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Court rejected the government's assertion that it held the power to
impose severe penalties on any collective refusal to work, no matter
how minor the refusal, explicitly introducing the doctrine of proportionality
involving governmental actions in the application of the
119
law.

Thus, by the late 1960s, Japanese judges, including Justices on the
Supreme Court, began to rule occasionally against the government.
Correspondingly, popular interest focused on how courts would respond to future requests from citizens opposing governmental control. At the same time, the makeup of the judiciary was undergoing a
significant transformation: Judges who had been educated in postwar
democratic Japan,"n were finishing their initial ten-year probationary
period as assistant judges,'2 ' and were moving into positions of responsibility in the courts.
Some of these judges belonged to a study group called the Young
Lawyers Association (YA or Seinen Hritsuka Ky5kai), which was
founded in 1954 by 280 lawyers and 10 judges for the "promotion of
the ideals expressed in the present Constitution."'" Preservation of
the Constitution meant preservation of the constitutional principle of
pacifism and enforcement by judicial means of individual rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. This might, perhaps somewhat ironically, be characterized as strict construction and the implementation
of original intent. These judges, schooled in postwar democracy,
came from different political backgrounds, including socialism, the
left wing of the LDP, and communism. After a few years, roughly one
third of the new assistant judges entering the judiciary each year were
YLA members, so that by 1963, 140 judges were members of the organization." Such judicial members of the YLA started to publish
their own periodical on legal issues.
mate labor disputes and political activities, between degrees of illegality and public inconvenience and between mild sanctions and criminal penalties that would be disproportionate for
failure to perform a contractual obligation." Id. at 231.
"' This doctrine of proportionality is central to the ICCPR, which Japan ratified in 1979.
The use and interpretation of this doctrine emerged as a major issue in litigation of ICCPR
claims before Japanese courts. See infra note 274-275, 310 and accompanying text.
" A brief era of so-called peace education after the war was brought to an abrupt halt in
1953 after consultations between Hayato Ikeda, head of the LDP's Policy Research Committee
and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robertson. This consultation:
resulted in a repudiation of the goals of peace education and a strong insistence upon the necessity of patriotic education as part of a program designed to propel Japan's remilitarization. Of course, this gave rise to the
contradiction, still visible in Japanese life today, of a form of patriotism that
is subordinated to American global interests.
HoRIo, supranote 38, at 143.
...
Japanese judges are initially appointed on a probationary basis subject to reappointment
at the end of ten years. See Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control ofJapaneseJudges, in LAW AND
TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNrrY 263, 265 (Philip S.C. Lewis ed., 1994), reprinting25
KOBE U. L. REv. 45 (1991) (providing a valuable overview of the Japanese judicial system).
'n Id. at 274.
' See id.
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In 1968, an article was published in a conservative political journal
alleging that certain named judges were members of the of the YIA
and were "communists.""- The Supreme Court bought copies of the
magazine containing the list of judges alleged to be YLA members
and distributed them to courts all over the country. Conservative
politicians focused on the judiciary; for instance, the Justice Minister
It was in
called for a crackdown on an "out of control" judiciary."
this context, that, in 1969, and incident of direct heavy-handed political intervention occurred in a lawsuit concerning Article 9 of the
Constitution." Two scholars bluntly characterize what ensued as an
LDP launched witch hunt.'" A full-scale purge of YLA members from
the bench quickly followed. The General Secretariat of the Supreme
Court (GS), the administrative arm of the Court employing career
judges, asked all judges in the GS to resign from the YLA; the secretary general of the GS prohibited all judges from joining "political
organizations" because of the appearance of impropriety and punished those who failed to sever their ties with the YLA. Many judges
resigned and the judges' section of YLA dissolved."'
B.Article 9 Litigation:Amendment by Installment
and the PoliticalControl of theJudiciary
Lawsuits over the constitutionality of Japan's rearmament triggered the crackdown on those judges who enforced the Constitution.
Ajudge who refused to cooperate with the process of amendment by
installment set off the direct LDP intervention into the judiciary. Article 9, the constitutional provision requiring pacifism was, and remains, sweeping in scope. In its entirety, Article 9 states:
1. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of set-

tling international disputes.
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land,
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, wUill never be
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.12

12 See id.
at 275. The Communist Party was, of course, then and is still now a legal political
party injapan. See id
See id. at 275.
See infm notes 147-157 and accompanying text for discussion of this case and the repercussions.
SeeRMisEYER & ROSENBLUTH,JAPAN'S PoLrLMAP.KETPLAC, supra note 103. at 162.
'
For a detailed summary of this process, see Nfi)zawa, supranote 121, at 274-77.
KENP5art 9.
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Yet, Japan now has the second largest defense budget in the world
and an extensive military force," ° and like the rest of the Japanese
Constitution, Article 9 has never been amended. The origin and evolution of this provision is controversial, especially since several of the
major actors have given contradictory accounts."'
The military build-up began shortly after the Japanese Constitution came into force.'' In 1951, Japan entered into a security treaty
with the United States that obligated Japan to maintain a standing
military force, the SDF." The conservative leaders split in a complex
response." Hard line conservatives favored a full rearmament and a

"o SeeAuer, supra note 60, at 83 (describing the Japanese military material in the mid-1990s).
...See id. at 71. The original suggestion seems to have come from Prime Minister Shidehara
but at different times it has suited both American and Japanese participants to either claim or
shift responsibility for the provision. See id. at 70-74; cf.Royer, supra note 60, 777-78.
Two amendments to the SCAP version were introduced in committee deliberations in the
House of Representatives. The first change, added to the beginning of the first sentence, consisted of the words "aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order."
The second change, called the Ashida amendment, added to the beginning of the second sentence, consisted of the words "in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph." As
Ashida explained, without these additions, the blanket prohibition of the provision would have
been stark. With the additional language the provision could be interpreted as limiting the
prohibition to aggressive war, thereby allowing self-defense. At the time, however, the changes
were claimed to have no substantive affect on the scope of the provision. See KOSEKI, supra note
30, at 192-211.
'" Initially, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to establish a 75,000-man National Police Reserve (NPR), ostensibly to replace occupation forces withdrawn to serve in the Korean
conflict. See Auer, supra note 60, at 74. The NPR was transformed into the National Safety
Forces in 1952 and, into its present form, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954. See id. at 69.
The subterfuges employed were rather crude; tanks of the NPR were called "special vehicles," generals from the former Imperial Army were not allowed to join, but men of the rank of
colonel and below were accepted. See id. at 74.
'" The later renewal (actually a major expansion of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, often referred in Japanese as AMPO) in the summer of 1960 marked a crossroads in postwar Japanese
democracy. The choices were to continue the postwar system established by the United States
to subordinate Japanese foreign policy and democratic processes to United States policy objectives or to begin to formulate an independent line based on popular sovereignty. President
Eisenhower's administration pressed hard for the treaty's "renewal." Then Prime Minister Kishi, a former class A war criminal who had been abruptly and without public reason released
from Sugamo prison in the early days of the occupation as part of the reverse course of United
States policy and whose political career had risen swiftly thereafter, ordered police to remove
opposition politicians from the Diet Building and then rammed through the renewal of the
treaty in the absence of the opposition. His actions provoked massive nationwide protests
which were met with a quasi-military response from the government. "The scholar Chalmers
Johnson likens the anti-AMPO revolt to the Hungarian revolution of 1956, minus the tanks and
troops." SMITH, supranote 6, at 28. Smith goes on to criticize this provocative analogy, arguing
that the United States is so mesmerized by the myth of its victory culture that it must resort to
analogies of Soviet misdeeds to understand its own misdeeds around the globe. See id.
" Ever since the conservative Liberal Party of Yoshida and the conservative Democratic Party
of Hatoyama (formerly the Progressive Party) merged in 1955, the resulting LDP has encompassed both policies toward Article 9, including both a limited revision by political reinterpretation to manage United States pressure and a drive for an outright repeal of the provision. See,
e.g., TETSUYA KATAOKA, THE PRICE OF A CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGIN OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR

PoLITIcs 129-62 (1991) (providing a lucid account of this process).
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constitutional amendment. Others, wary of United States pressure
which permeated the period, favored a limited rearmament while using the constitutional provision as a shield against United States coercion." Regardless, the result of the complicated cross currents w-as
rearmament without a formal amendment of Article 9." Not surprisingly, groups supportive of the Constitution and opposed to United
States' domination ofJapanese foreign policy turned to the courts for
relief."
The Japanese judiciary has, with limited exceptions, rebuffed all
such litigation. The Supreme Court, relying on a series of mechanisms, including the political question doctrine, creative statutory
construction and manipulation of standing doctrine, steadfastly
avoided ruling directly on the constitutionality of the SDF and the
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. There have been five major cases:'' Sunakawa,19 Eniwa,' ' Sakane,'" Naganuma Nike Missile Base Case,"u and the
Many major conservative politicians have played various roles in this struggle. In 1955, a
young Nakasone Yasuhiro even composed the Constitutional Revision Song and tried to promote it by giving personal appearances on television. See id. at 137.
" See Royer, supra note 60, at 779 (discussing the views of Prime Minister Yoshida and former Prime Minister, now Nfinister of Finance, ,MiyazawaKiichi). A limited rearmament strategy
would have allowedJapan to focus primarily on economic development while nurturing a small
military and its allied industrial base, both capable of rapid expansion if needed. This school of
conservative thought opposed amending the constitutional provision in favor of a politically
controlled reinterpretation in which military defensive capability would be constitutional. Set
id. at 787.
L"But it is a strange rearmament. As one scholar succinctly stated, the rearmament is
"dearly complementary to rather than autonomously separatefrom U.S. military power. See Auer,
supranote 60, at 83. Moreover, this nexus ofJapanese and U.S. military power, the U.S-Japan
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, is "the United States' most important security arrangement in the Pacific and... already rivals in importance the United States' ties %ith the
North Atlantic Treaty Association." Id. at 82. This military arrangement both places severe constraints on Japan's foreign policy complicating its relations with its Asian neighbors, and also
shieldsJapan to some extent from charges of reasserting military dominance in Asia. See id. at
83-84.
"7 See id. at 80 ("In the 1950s and 1960s, a significant percentage of citizens questioned seriously the legality of the nation's armed forces .... Opposition to the SDF on constitutional
grounds developed from three major court cases .... ").
m For detailed accounts of the five cases, see Bolz, supra note 3, at 104-13; Auer. supra note
60, at 80-82; Royer, supranote 60, at 782-85.
" SeeJapan v. Sakata, 13 KEmsHii 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16. 1959); Auer. supra note 60, at
90 (summarizing case).
" SeeJapan v. Nozaki, 9 KEwsHii 359 (Sapporo Dist. CL, Mar. 29, 1967): Bolz, supra note 3, at
106 (summarizing case).
...
SeeJapan v. Sakane, 23 KEISHI 5, 685 (Sup. CL, G.B., Apr. 12, 1969), translatedrn BEER &
ITOH, SELECTED SUPRF-ME CouRT DEcISIONS, 1961-70, supra note 117, at 103.
" The Nike Missie Base Case litigation comprises two separate, but related actions. See infra
note 151. The first set of litigation ran from 1969 to 1970. See Ito. v. Minister of Agriculture
and Forestry, 5 HANRIJIiHi 581 (Sapporo High CL, Jan. 23. 1970), revu'23 KkI-m JIH6 565
(Sapporo Dist. Ct., Aug. 22, 1969); McNelly, supra note 3, at nn.54-55 (providing citations).
The second set, generally known as the Naganuma ide Missile Site Cas ran subsequently. &e
Uno et al. v. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 36 MLwSHii 9, 1679 (Sup. Ct.. Sept.
9, 1982) [hereinafter Naganuma Nitke Missile Site Cas4 111], aftg27 G". u REIsidi 8, 1175 (Sapporo H. CL, Aug. 5, 1976) [hereinafter Naganuma ,IMe Missile Site Case II], reu' 712 I-LA.N]i 24
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relatively recent Hyakuri Base Case."' The refusal to rule on the constitutionality of Article 9 has been characterized as the judiciary's preference for sending political disputes back to the political process.'
Such a characterization, however, may not be completely adequate.''
A strong argument may be made that the judiciary has succumbed to
governmental pressure.
Recourse to the political question doctrine and extreme deference to executive authority have serious consequences when applied
to a possible violation of pacifism, one of the three fundamental
principles of the Constitution. The Constitution was designed to balance the retention of the emperor system by providing strong civilian
control of the military in Article 66(2) and Article 9's prohibition on
rearmament.'46 It may well be argued that this design has outlived its
usefulness and should be revised, but the judiciary's shielding of the
government from judicial review of military decisions means that the
essential checks and balances of power have shifted decisively.
Rather than showing judicial restraint, the judiciary has effectively
permitted the fundamental redesign of the Constitution.'47 The Na-

(Sapporo Dist. Ct., Sept. 7, 1973) [hereinafter Naganuma Nike Missile Site Case, 1],translated in
BEER & ITOH, 1970 THROUGH 1990, supra note 8, at 83.
. See Ishizaka et al v.Japan [HyakuriBase Case], 43 MINSHfl 6, 385 (Sup. Ct.,June 20, 1989),
translated in BEER & ITOH, 1970 THROUGH 1990, supranote 8, at 130.
14 See, e.g., Royer, supra note 60, at 775.
Royer attempts to draw a parallel between the development of the War Powers Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the treatment of Article 9 in
the Japanese legal system. See id. at 770-90, 797-98. But the parallel seems strained at best. Although the U.S. judiciary, like many others, rightly hesitates to intrude into foreign policy issues, it has occasionally done so. Moreover, Congress, whose control shifts between parties and
is often controlled by a party different from that of the President, has acted under the War
Powers Act to counterbalance expanding executive power. In Japan, the LDP has controlled
the legislature and the executive during the entire postwar period. The only possible check on
executive power is the judiciary, but the judiciary has uniformly refused to check the executive.
Instead, it refers such issues to the legislative forum, which is, of course, controlled by the same
party as the executive.
" As one scholar sympathetic to the Japanese Supreme Court's style of postwar constitutionalism admits, the Court's "deference to the judgment of the government is nearly perfect."
Ford, supra note 4, at 37 (providing statistical analysis of the Court's findings in matters alleging
unconstitutionality in criminal matters). That is, the Court has agreed with the national government in almost every case which has come before it.
SeeKENP6 art. 66(2).
', This process of redesigning the Japanese Constitution has been variously characterized.
Some Japanese scholars reconcile the gap between constitutional text and the actual state of
things by the term "constitutional transformation" (kenpJ hensen). See, e.g., Kasuya, supra note
60, at 1 ("Constitutional transformation denotes a change in the meaning of a particular constitutional provision brought about through 'reinterpretation' of the provision... "). A more
candid assessment comes from a German scholar:
Regarding the question of the constitutionality of Japan's Self-Defense
Forces, one must draw the conclusion that LDP's arguments are not legally
sound but simply politically motivated. The lapse of time does not change
acts that were in clear contravention of the Constitution at the time of
their commission. The position of the LDP is at best a politically expedient
distortion of basic concepts of constitutional theory. The LDP wants to
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ganuma Nike Missile Base Case is a flash point exposing both the Supreme Court's unwillingness to controvert the government on constitutional matters and the pressures placed on lower judges to follow
the government's line.
The conflict behind the Nagunuma Missile Base Case arose when
the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry announced that a virgin forest in Hokkaido was to be stripped of its designation as a conservation
area so that it could be transferred to the Air Self-Defense for construction of a Nike missile base. Local citizens filed two actions
against the Minister."' First, the citizens filed an action for suspension of the order on grounds that an increased danger of flood resulted from the watershed loss."' Later, plaintiff citizens filed a separate action for the reversal of the order on the grounds that the
delisting was not in the public interest, as is required by law, alleging
that the construction of the missile base would violate Article 9."
Before the final decision was issued,Judge Hiraga Kenta, the chief
judge of the Sapporo District Court, wrote a letter to presidingJudge
Fukushima Shiegeo, stating that the judiciary did not have the
authority to rule on the constitutionality of the SDF, and asking Fukushima to accept the government's position in the case by dismissing the Article 9 claim."' Judge Fukushima publicly revealed this improper pressure, igniting a fierce controversy. The impropriety of
the pressure from the head of the Sapporo District Court on Judge
Fukushima was shocking, but the consequences of that incident were
even more disturbing.' At first, the head of the court was simply reprimanded and recalled to Tokyo. Later, however, both Judge Fukushima and his former superior were subjected to impeachment procedures in the Diet because of the pressure applied by conservative
politicians. In 1970, the final decision was announced."' The head of
change the Constitution through the political process in lieu of the procedures of article 96.
Reinhard Neumann, The Inaba Affair. Constitution Day and Constitutional Retwon, sn 9 L\W rN
JAPAN 129, 138-39 (1976).
See Naganuma Nike Missile Case, 11,supra note 142, at 85 (discussing early suits).
See id. at 89-91.
'o See id.
"
See Miyazaia, supra note 121, at 275. In August 1969, the Sapporo District CourtJudge,
Shigeo Fukushima, ordered the suspension of the Minister's order. Se McNellI, supra note 3, at
99 (discussing Ito v. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, 23 HA.'VREJIll 6 565 (Sapporo Dist.
Ct., Aug. 22, 1969)). Within five months, however, the Sapporo High Court reversed judge Fukushima's decision on the grounds that there was no urgent necessity to prevent irreparable
damage since flood measures had been taken. See Ito. v.Minister of Agricuhure and Forestry. 5
HANRUJIH6 581 (Sapporo High Ct.,Jan. 23, 1970); see also supra note 142. The base was subsequently built. During the next four years the second suit filed by the interested citizens went
fonvard. The District Court had jurisdiction to hear the Article 9 claim because decisions are
technically binding only on the parties in a case and therefore, in a strict sense, decisions of the
higher courts, even the Supreme Court, are not binding as precedent on lower courts. As a resuIt, technically, the Sapporo District Court .vas free to hear the claim.
See fiyazawa, supranote 121, at 275.
m See iU
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the court was not reprimanded. The impeachment proceedings were
dropped and he subsequently joined the Tokyo High Court, the most
prestigious position outside of a Supreme Court appointment. Yet
the Prosecuting Committee of the Diet severely reprimanded Judge
Fukushima and left his impeachment suspended. His career did not
advance and he resigned before the mandatory retirement age. Undeniably, the disproportionate punishment of the whistleblower was
due in part to a larger political struggle within the judiciary. The
same Diet Committee mounted official inquiries against 213 other
judges for their alleged membership in the YIA, and shortly thereafter, the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court asked all the
member judges to withdraw from the YLA.
In 1973, Judge Fukushima ruled that the law establishing the SDF
violates Article 9 and that the forest had been illegally delisted.'" He
rejected application of the political question doctrine as it was then
formulated, in a famous passage:"

Whenever the constitutionality of a statute is questioned, the matter
inevitably involves a question of a more or less political nature.... If
one excludes some acts of the government from the scope of judicial review by relying on a dangerous over broad interpretation of
such a vague concept, one might lead the way to closing the doors
of the court to people asking redress for the blundering of the government.w
The High Court, as is customary in Japan, heard witnesses in nine
hearings and then, in what was a very unusual action, abruptly terminated the hearings and quickly ruled that the plaintiffs had no standing to sue. 57' The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's ruling.'"
The political message was clear: The doors of the Japanese courts are
firmly closed against Article 9 cases and judges who ruled against the
government in politically important cases did so at their peril.
C. Mechanismsfor PoliticalControl of the JapaneseJudiciay
A number of authors argue that the government through the
Chief Justice of the Japanese Supreme Court and the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court ("GS")' 9 exercises excessive control over
See Naganuma Nike Missile Site Case, I, supra note 142, at 90-112.
See id at 93-94.
See TANAKA, THEJAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 714 (reprinting Naganuma Nike
Missile Case, 1).
17 See Naganuma Nike Missile Site Case, II, supra note 142, at 112,114.
1"6 See Nike Missile Site Case, III, supra note 142, at 127-29.
Overseen by a chief administrator called the secretary general, the GS is divided into
'
156

seven bureaus: general affairs, personnel affairs, accounting, civil cases, criminal cases, administrative cases, and family cases. The approximately forty-five judges working full-time in the GS
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lower court judges by utilizing a series of complex mechanisms.
These persuasive arguments include both anecdotal based accounts,
such as Professor Miyazaw's seminal article, and more statistically
based articles provided by U.S. scholars, including Professor Ramseyer and his collaborators.' The effect of these mechanisms, which
include ideologically based screening of applicants, punitive use of
reappointments and transfers, and judicial conferences designed to
influence decisions, is to encourage judges to interpret the constraints imposed on the government and the Diet narrowly and to rob
the constitution of its vitality.
The GS offers several rationales for this centralized authority in
the hands of a fewjudges selected by co-option."' First, the GS argues
that the judiciary is the politically weakest branch of government and
hence needs full-time staff to defend its independence and integrity.
Second, GS staff needs special administrative skills and "political sensitivity" when dealing with governmental agencies, political parties

and other outside forces. Third, since GS administrative work is so
difficult, GS judges deserve preferential treatment in local court assignments. Finallyjudges with a proven ability to deal ith complex
issues should be given preferential treatment. Such administrative arguments make sense, but the problem is whether this centralized
authority has been co-opted politically.
Judges in Japan are recruited directly from the national government's Legal Training and Research Institute ("LTRI") (Shih
Kenshlsho). Judges must serve a ten-year probationary period before
being promoted to a full judgeship and full judges are subject to
reappointment every ten years."n In addition, judges are transferred
between courts an average of three times during each ten-year appointment."' The promotional course from smaller courts in less
prestigious locations to desirable assignments in the Tokyo and
Osaka High Courts, along with the accompanying and significant in-

are technically lower court judges, but, in practice, they exercise supervisory power o~er all sitting judges in the district and high courts, especially through the power of transfers and reappointments. See Myazawa, supm note 121, at 267.
" For an easily available and detailed, yet anecdotal, account in English examnining the issue
of the documented administrative control ofjudges, see Nfi)zaa, supra note 121. For a contrasting, American contribution consisting of a more statistcally-oriented account, based on
rational choice theory, see RA.MSEYR & ROSFNBLUTH, JAPAN's PoLcALuMARKET PlAcE supra

note 108, at 161-81: see alsoJ. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen.JudicialIndependence in a Chrl
Law Regime: The Evidence FromJapan,13 J.L ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997). This latter paper con-

tains an excellent bibliography of both English andJapanese sources on this topic.
See Miyazawa, supra note 121, at 268 (outlining the GS's arguments).
'
See id at 264-65. The LTRI has been called Japan's only law school. Individuals who have
completed an undergraduate degree, usually in law, must pass thc rigorous LTRI entrance
exam and then successfully complete the Institute's two-year course before being qualified to
become an assistantjudge, a state attorney or a la)er. See id.
'

- See id. at 265.
Seeid.
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creases in pay, is clearly defined."u
Since there are no publicly acknowledged standards for the recruitment, retention or promotion ofjudges, each phase of judiciary
advancement becomes an opportunity for the government through
the GS to exercise control over the judiciary. Indeed, judges in the
GS are promoted faster and, often, to higher-level positions than nonGSjudges, with many ultimately becoming Supreme Court Justices."
For example, the last four Supreme Court Justices were all GS
judges.67 In particular, the post of Secretary General of the GS is frequently seen as a critical stepping stone to the Court. " Judges in the
GS often spend most of their careers in the GS, before sitting only
briefly asjudges in lower courts, and later on the Supreme Court.
The appointment process provides an initial mechanism of control by facilitating the political screening of candidates who wish to
enter the judiciary. The standard of appointment is not disclosed
publicly and the Supreme Court does not give reasons for refusals."n
Since 1970, approximately fifty candidates believe 7 that
they were re°
jected because of their political thoughts or beliefs. 1
The threat of denial of reappointment and discriminatory transfers are additional mechanisms to punish judges who do not tow the
ideological line of the GS."' Denial of reappointment occurred only
once, in 1971 to Judge Miyamoto Yasuaki, an active member of YLA.
Then, a year after Miyamoto's dismissal, YLA member Konno Toshio
of the Nagoya Family Court heard that he would suffer the same fate
and resigned.7 The Supreme Court stated publicly that Miyamoto's
YLA membership was "not the only reason." The other factor may
have been Judge Miyamoto's unusual decision to go to prison to interrogate radical students.'7'
Some commentators, including John Haley, have criticized the
logic of concluding that selective reappointment operates to subtly
control or limit the decision making of the lower courtjudges. Haley
admits that since the denial occurred during a time of heightened
See id.at 265-66.
See id. at 267.
167 See id.
See id. at 267-68.
1
'

1'6

See HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 96 (1993)

In 1994, Kamisaka Naoki's case gained public attention. After being rejected without any
given cause, he sued the Supreme Court for appointment as ajudge (1994) and sued the government for damages (1995). See O'BRIEN, supra note 64, 136-37. The first case was rejected
without hearings in Tokyo District Court and Tokyo High Court and is now pending before tie
Supreme Court. See id. at 136. The damages suit is pending before Osaka District Court.
171 See id. at 274-77.
'2
See RAmSEYER & ROSENBLUTH,JAPAN'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE, supra note 108, at 165.
'" But some observers suggest that Miyamoto was merely a slow, mediocre judge. See id. If
so, he must have been remarkably inefficient since no other judge has been refused
reappointment in the postwar era. The lack of any other such public dismissals may be due, in
part, to doomed judges resigning to avoid the humiliation of being refused reappointment as
Judge Konno did. See id.
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radical student activity, Judge Miyamoto was probably denied promoHaley, however, emphation in order to curb the YLA's influence.'
sizes that the denial was immediately followed by widespread public
outcry and opines that no sitting judge has been denied
reappointment and promotion for political purposes since judge Miyamoto.n He concludes that the backlash effectively precludes the
further use of reappointment for political purposes.'"
Professor Ramseyer and his collaborators, however, provide a
more nuanced explanation, acknowledging that although denial occurred only once, this single time was likely enough to cause a chilling effect among lower court judges.' Creating a chilling effect allows a certain amount of slack in the system to keep the cost of
controlling the system within bounds and, conceivably, to maintain
the appeararice ofjudicial independence. Ramseyer wTote:
They do not punish all deviant judges-but they do not need to do
so: in England, as Voltaire reminds us, "it [was] thought well to kill
an admiral from time to time to encourage the others." So long as
principals set the punishment high enough, they can constrain their
agents with less than full enforcement.'a
The key recognition is that by controlling the GS the LDP controls
judicial careers without being seen to intervene and thus minimizing
the political costs of control."n That is, "the ideal judges are those
with the
reputation for independence... who actually tow the party
"
line. IS
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to connect the tightened political screening at the recruitment phase with the fact that no assistant
judge since 1971 has been refused reappointment.'" Lastly, technicallyjudges cannot be transferred against their will, " but in fact refusal of a proposed transfer would unquestionably harm a judge's future career and so most accept these orders issued under the name of
the Supreme Court. Because the course of promotions is so clear,
punitive transfers are obvious."'
SeeHaley, supra note 103, 10-11.
,- See id.
176&eid
"3

" See RAMsEYER & RASMUSEN,JAPAN'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACF, supra
"3

note 108, at 161-62.

Id. at 162.

" SeeRamseyer & RasmusenJudidiallndepmndencAsupra note 160, at 268. The political costs
of heavy handed, direct intervention may be high as Ramseyer and Rasmusen suggest. but in
the some instances, such as the case ofJudge Fukushima. the LDP has been willing to pay that
price. See id
"3 Id. at 262.
III SeeMiyazawa, supra note 121, at 266.
" See Code of the Courts (Saibansho H5), April 16, 1947, Law. No. 59, Art. 48.
Ifflyazawa traces the dowmward career pattern of a judge who held, contran to the Supreme Court, that the prohibition of door-to-door canvassing for political campaigning uas un-
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The GS uses two other mechanisms to ensure favorable treatment
of the government's position: dispatching of judges outside the judiciary and judicial conferences."' The GS dispatches judges in small
but increasing numbers to governmental agencies other than the
Ministry of Justice, such as private law firms and major business corporations."n Many more judges are dispatched to work as state attorneys in the Ministry ofJustice itself, primarily on civil and administrative cases in which the government is a party, as well as in the
Ministry's bureau of civil legislation.'" In 1991, according to Professor Miyazawa, "the heads of the Justice Ministry bureaus of solicitors
[state attorneys] and civil legislation and a majority of solicitors working at the Justice Ministry headquarters and local solicitor's offices
are loaned judges." 7
The GS argues that these practices give new judges, who often
have had little prior employment experience before graduating from
the LTRI, a chance to better comprehend the inner workings of
Japanese society." But Miyazawa and other Japanese critics strongly
agree that the real purpose is to promote the government's perspective among judges." In addition, the Justice Ministry lends prosecutors to the judiciary as judges, usually to the major courts of Tokyo
and Osaka.'M Similarly GS-loaned judges are often assigned specifically to the Ministry of Justice sections which deal with administrative
suits against the government."'
Furthering the suspicion that this exchange is designed to encourage ruling in favor of the government, some of these judges, after returning from a tour in the Ministry of Justice, appear to be assigned to particular cases in order to achieve specific outcomes. As
constitutional. See Miyazawa, supra note 121, at 271. Readers with American training must remember that Japanese lower court judges have the power in subsequent cases to hold differently than the Supreme Court. For example, one the three judges discussed by Miyazawa, Abe
Haruhiko, held in 1972, in opposition to the Supreme Court's earlier ruling, that the heavier
criminal penalty for killing one's parent than for killing non-ancestors was unconstitutional. In
1973, the Supreme Court changed its position and adopted Abe's position.
See id at 269, 271-74.
See id. at 269 (indicating that the practice of dispatching judges to firms & corporations
serves, in part, to promote governmental perspectives among judges).
' See id Miyazawa notes that judges lent to the Ministry ofJustice to serve as state attorneys
handle civil and administrative cases. Because the career track of the Ministry ofJustice favors
those who have worked as criminal prosecutors, Ministry lawyers are generally unwilling to handle non-criminal cases. Judges fill this void.
"7 Id. at 269.
1n See id
"9 See id- Japanese Supreme CourtJustices have also risen by this route. An extreme case is
Justice Kagawa, who worked only one month as ajudge and then was dispatched to the Ministry
ofJustice where he spent the next twenty-nine years. He then returned to the judiciary, serving
three and a half years in prestigious posts such as chief judge of the Tokyo High Court, and
then became a Supreme CourtJustice.
" See id.Miyazawa reports that of the 264 prosecutors loaned to the judiciary from 1975 to
1989, eighty one percent were assigned to these two cities (67% to Tokyo and 14% to Osaka).
191 See id. at 270.
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an illustration, Miyazawa offers the example of the Nagara River litigation.'" Flooding from this river heavily damaged two towns in the
Gifu prefecture, Anpachi and Sunomata, and led to the filing of two
lawsuits against the national government, which was responsible for
the management of major rivers. In 1982, in a decision that received
nationwide attention, a three-judge panel of the Gifu District Court,
headed by ChiefJudge Akimoto, held the national government liable
for flood damage to the Anpachi plaintiffs. Subsequently, ChiefJudge
Watanabe Takeo replaced Judge Akimoto, although Watanobe's
background contrasted markedly with that of Akimoto. Judge Watanabe worked from 1975 to 1980 as a state attorney at the Ministry of
Justice headquarters, rising to the head of administrative litigation
and then advancing on to the Tokyo High Court. It was highly unusual, however, forjudge with a background like Judge Watanabe's to
be sent to sit as a district court judge, particularly in the less prestigious locale of Nagoya. In 1984, a three judge panel, including Judge
Watanabe and the same two judges who had participated in the Anpachi decision, issued3 a decision in the Sunonala case decisively
against the plaintiffs.1
It appears that the undue governmental influence interfered with
the resolution of cases such as the Nigara River litigation. Given that
the most significant structural innovation of Japan's post-war government was the separation of the judiciary from the direct control of
the Ministry of Justice, the practice of swapping prosecutors and
judges, as well as the seeming assignment of judges to achieve progovernment results, appears to have seriously undermined this intended organizational separation. The change is brought about not
by public deliberation in the Diet or popular values, but by the efforts
of judges controlling the bureaucracy of the judiciary, the GS. Far
from being independent, the judiciary seems to be driven by the GS
into the embrace of the bureaucracy of the executive and the Ministry of Justice, which, given the virtually unbroken rule of the LDP,
means the control of the LDP.
Lastly, Professor Miyazawa suggests that judicial conferences contribute to the General Secretariat's control ofjudges and judicial decisions.'" Until 1970, these conferences were forums of free discussion. Each court selected its own representative and records of the
conferences were published and available to the public. After 1970,
however, matters changed. Lowers courts have been ordered to send
judges handling specific cases to a conference considering that topic
See i&. (describing the flood and resulting litigation).
See i&. The subsequent careers of the two chiefjudges suggest the power of the GS to manipulate judges. Judge Akimoto's career took a decisive dowward turn when he was subsequently transferred to a Numazu branch of the Shizuoka District Court. Similarly. Judge Watanabe was recalled to the Tokyo area to the Tokyo District Court and then the Yokohama District
Court.
' See id. at 271.
'
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and records are no longer publicly available. Even the identities of
the participants are not disclosed in documents meant for internal
circulation. The rationale for such conferences is that lower courts
lack the time and resources to analyze complex cases without support
from the GS. Although the conferences offer advice, the opinions
expounded by the GS are presented as the official position of the
various bureaus that prepared them. The message to the lower
courts seems clear. Many judges, according to Professor Miyazawa,
"now consider these conferences as chances to ask the GS to tell them
about its policies."'95 In a legal system where higher court decisions
are not binding on future cases, this orchestration of policy can be
seen as a means to ensure a pro-government consistency in decisions.
Professor Haley disagrees. In fact, he attacks the views of Miyazawa, who is of course Japanese, and Ramseyer, in particular, dismissing their criticisms of the GS as "American" and as failing to give due
regard to the civil law background of the Japanese system.' 9 Instead,
Haley claims that it is the considerable power of the GS that ensures
judicial conformity. 7 Japanese judges, he maintains, although not as
individually autonomous as British, American, or French judges, together create a cohesive system for defining Japanese law which
would be precluded by increased independence.'
Indeed, Haley
'
Id. at 272. The evidence for this is a GS document entitled "Materials on Handling Civil
Damage Suits Against the Government Caused by Floods," which was circulated to district and
high courts in March, 1985 and which accidentally came into the possession of an attorney in
1987. The document originated at a GS judicial conference held in December, 1983, one
month before the Supreme Court would hand down the major ruling severely limiting governmental responsibility in flood damage cases. Professor Miyazawa concludes that the GS was informing lower court judges of a major ruling before it occurred to encourage them to decide
their cases in conformity with the future law. Given the secrecy of the conferences, one is left
wondering about how common such guidance may be. See id. at 271-72.
'
See Haley, supranote 103, at 17.
Haley's claim that the GS intervention creates valuable uniformity must be critically evaluated in terms of history. As a counter-example, one of the most important consequences of the
purge of the judiciary and the corresponding exercise of tighter control by conservative judges
was the reversal of the Toko CentralPost Office Case. See Tokyo CentralPost Office Case, supra note
117, at 85. This case established totality of the circumstances and proportionality analysis for
determining the right to strike. See Taisuke Kamata, Adjudication and the Governing Proceu:Political Questions and Legislative Discretion, inJAPANESE CONSTITUT1ONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 151,
161. But in 1973, the Supreme Court abandoned this approach in the All-Japan Agriculture and
Forestry Workers Union case. See Tsuruzono v. Japan, 27 KEISHfi 547 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 25,
1973). The Court cited to "a policy of comprehensive restriction of public worker rights based
on a literal interpretation of statutes and disregard of the substantial diversity among types of
public employees in Japan." Kamata, supra, at 162.
"* See Haley, supra note 103, at 14. Haley, however, misrepresents the way political power is
exercised by the LDP. He recounts the unquestioning trust of Prime Minister Kaifu in the recommendation of outgoing Chief Justice Yaguchi Koichi of Kusaba Ryohachi as the "judiciary's
choice" to be the next ChiefJustice as "typical" and thus proof that, in general, LDP politicians
have not influenced the judiciary. Yet, such an anecdote actually supports the position of critics
who see undue LDP control of thejudiciary. Under Prime Minister Kaifu the political situation
became so unstable that loss of power by the LDP seemed possible. To forestall the possibility
that a non-LDP administration might appoint a Chief Justice, Kusaba, a relatively young Supreme Court Justice was selected so that his potentially long tenure as Chief Justice would en-
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emphasizes the intentions of judges in the GS to preserve the independence of the judiciary by thwarting judicial rulings that would offend the LDP and lead to more direct, heav-handed political interEven if one accepts Professor
vention by political power-brokers.l
Haley's arguments, his claim is troubling. In effect, he argues that the
insiders in control of the Japanese Judiciary have imposed policies
and legal doctrines favorable to the LDP in order to forestall direct
imposition of the LDP's policies; the outward appearance of independence is saved so long as the judiciary does not offended the political power center. But this is Ramseyer's point: the LDP benefits
politically by securing its policy objectives byjudicial agents who seem
to be independent. The effect is the same; the process is more effident. The issue is not one of culture or the appreciation of stability,
but rather whether the Japanese judiciary will enforce the Constitution.
D. The Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Constitution
Given the tight control exercised over the Judiciary, attention
must be directed at those decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court
outside the context of Article 9 where the Court has used its power to
overturn laws as unconstitutional. The analysis is however short.
Since 1947, the Court has only found laws to be unconstitutional six
times.' Many scholars have criticized the Court for its seemingly excessive restraint in finding laws unconstitutional as well as the lack of
impact of the cases in which the Court did so rule. Two of the six rulings dealt with the regulation of economic rights."l In Hiraguchi v.
Hiraguchi,for example, the Court struck down a law restricting the
partitioning of co-owned forests." In Sumiyoshi, Inc. v. Governor, Hiroshima Prefecture, known as the Phannay Case, the economic regulation mandated a certain distance between pharmacies in order to
prevent the danger of supplying defective medicines as a result of
heightened competition or instability of business."' The Court in the
Pharmacy Case found such a causal connection to be unreasonable
and held that the law violated Article 22's guarantee of freedom of
sure the continuation of established policies even if the opposition gained power. Se
YAMAMOTO YiiJI, SAIK6SAI MONOGATARI [THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT) 377-78 (1997).
19 See Haley, supra note 103, at 18.
See Hidenori Tomatsu, EqualProtection ofthie Lau, inJAPNESE Co\sr- rLno\,%. L'w, supra
note 5, at 187,202.
" See Hiraguchi v. Hiraguchi, 41 MINSHU 3,408 (Sup. CL, Apr. 22. 1987), translatd in BEER
& ITOH, 1970 THROUGH 1990, supra note 8, at 327-45; Sumiyoshi, Inc. v. Governor, Hiroshima
Prefecture, 29 MINSHiI 4,572 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 30, 1975) [hereinafter Phannai. Case, translated in
BEER & ITOH, 1970 THROUGH 1990, supra note 8, at 188-99.
See Hiraguchi,supra note 201, at 327-45.
See Pharmacy Case, supra note 201, at 188-99; see also Mutsuo Nakamura. Freedom of bFanorm
Activities and the Right to Property, in JAPANESE CONSTrIfONAL Lsav, supra note 5. at 255. 26U
(describing the Supreme Court's reasoning in the PharmacyCase).
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occupation.' The law in the third case, the Patricide Case of 1973,"°
was found unconstitutional on a technicality. Although the majority
found the law's purpose, to punish murderers of lineal ascendants
more severely than the murderers of other victims, to be constitutionally permissible, the Court held that the difference in punishment imposed was discriminatory and hence unconstitutional.'
In
Nakamura v. Japan,the Court held that property belonging to a third
party could not be seized without providing notice and the section of
the Customs Law which permitted seizure without such notice was
unconstitutional. 7 Finally, the Court has twice ruled that voter misapportionment is unconstitutional, but in both cases the Court refused to provide any remedy, such as invalidating the elections.'
Both voting rights cases had potential social importance, but the
Court's policy of declaring widely disproportionate electoral districts
unconstitutional, without invalidating the elections, has meant in
practice that such violations remain beyond the aid of the judiciary.'
The Court, for fear of invalidating the legislation passed by the representatives selected in the challenged elections, preferred merely to
urge the legislative branch to reform electoral districting laws.
Such a small body of decisions with virtually no impact on Japanese society has led some Japanese scholars to conclude that the Supreme Court is unwilling to impose the rule of law on governmental

See Pharmacy Case, supranote 201, at 188-99.
See Aizawa v.Japan, 27 KEhsifi 3, 265 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 4, 1973) (hereinafter PatricideCase of
1973], translated in BEER & ITOH, 1970 THROUGH 1990, supranote 8, at 143.
See id. (holding that the disparity between death or life imprisonment for murderers of
lineal descendants and a minimum sentence of three years imprisonment for the murder of
other victims, was discriminatory).
"7' See Nakamura et al. v.Japan, 16 KErsHfn 1593 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 28, 1962), translated in BEER
& ITOH, SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961-70, supra note 117, at 58-73.
' See Kanao et al v. Hiroshima PrefectureElection Comm'n, supra note 64; Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Comm'n, supra note 64.
m Unfortunately, the Japanese courts refused to grant any remedy in these voting rights
cases other than urging the Diet to mend its ways. The Diet has not responded enthusiastically
to such judicial invitations. SeeJAPAN TIMES, Aug. 11, 1998, at 2. Although districts were redrawn in the mid-1990s, the gap between densely and thinly populated voting districts for the
important, single seat districts of the House of Representatives has remained and even, recently,
widened to a maximum of 2.4 to 1. See id. As of March 31, 1998, out of the 300 single-seat districts, 74 had more than twice the population of the nation's smallest constituency, an increase
from 59 such districts a year ago, according to the Home Affairs Ministry. See id. The rural No.
3 constituency in Shimane Prefecture (the territory of LDP boss Takeshita Noboru) has only
242,544 residents; the most populous and most underrepresented district is the urban No. 14
constituency in Kanagawa Prefecture with 582,401 residents. See id.
For the upper house or House of Councillors,, the Supreme Court was reluctant to declare an election unconstitutional even though the imbalance between the weight of votes in
some districts exceeded 5 to 1. SeeJudgment of 27 April 1983, 37 MINSHfO 345. Finally, the Supreme Court held that a ration of 6.59 to 1 was unconstitutional. SeeJudgment of 11 September
1996, 922 HANREI TIMES 96. But the court did not declare the election unconstitutional, and
gave the Diet another period to remedy the problem. See id. So for the upper house, the constitutional line falls somewhere between 5 and 6.59 to 1.
"
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power."'° On the other hand, the courts seem quite willing to use
their power to maintain governmental power. Perhaps the most extreme example is the Nishiyanav.Japan case."' A newspaper reporter
named Nishiyama Takichi obtained politically sensitive information
from his lover, a Foreign Ministry employee, concerning the secret
terms of the reversion of Okinawa from the United States to Japan."'
The government had lied, saying there were no secret agreements to
the reversion when in fact it had covertly agreed to pay 5 million dollars to the Okinawans for land damage. The Supreme Court came to
the dubious conclusion that Nishiyama's news gathering activities
were illegal in light of the "spirit of [the] whole legal order."'
In contrast, when faced with constitutional claims by individuals to
welfare rights under Articles 25, 26, 27 and 28, the Court has been
exceedingly unwiUing to recognize governmental obligations. The
key constitutional provision is Article 25 (1), which sets forth the right
to a decent life.2 " This provision, from the Constitutional Research
Association's draft constitution used by SCAP, was added to the Constitution during the Diet's deliberations at the suggestion of the Socialist Party." The leading case on the right to a decent life, however,
handed down by the Supreme Court in 1948, concluded that Article
25(1) was merely a programmatic declaration that does not confer a
judicially enforceable right."' Succeeding cases dealing ith specific

' See, &g., Noriho Urabe, Rule of Law and Due Process:A CornparatelI?= of the Unsted States
andJapan, inJAPANEsE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 173, 182-84. Urabe argued:

The Supreme Court ofJapan does not seem to consider it important to
sustain the rule of law against governmental power. In the past forty or
more years of history, there have been only fives cases in which the Supreme Court has declared a statute unconstitutional. As there is no evidence that the Japanese legislature is particularly faithful to the Constitution, only five (sic) cases in forty years is too small a number. This fact
proves that the Supreme Court of Japan has almost no idea that government action should be bound strictly by the Constitution. If the core of
the rule of law is that governmental power be bound by law, and if the rule
of law is to be realized through the judicial process, the scarcity of court
decisions that have ruled statutes unconstitutional indicates that the rule of
law is not realized in practice in Japan.
Id at 182.
211 See Nishiyama v. Japan, 32 KEISHi] 3, 457 (Sup. CL, May 31, 1978), translated
in BEER &
ITOH, 1970 THROUGH 1990, supra note 8, at 543-47.
21 See i. at 545-46.
213 See iU at 546; see also Urabe, supra note 210, at 182. But see, for a different characterization of the case, BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 37, at 303-05.

2'4 Article 25(1) states in applicable part that "[a]ll people shall hae the right to maintain
the minimum standards ofwholesome and cultured living." KENP6 art. 25(1).
2- See Akira Osuka, I/Wfare Rights, in JAPANESE CONsTrrtuTIO.,L LAw, supra note 5, at 269,
271 ("Current clause 1 ... was added later during the discussions at the Constitutional
Diet (Kenpd Gikia) upon proposal by the Socialist Party.*)
216 SeeJudgment of 29 September 1948, Supreme Court, 2 KEISHii 1235. For a discussion of
the main theories of the right to a decent living, see Osuka, supranote 64, at 272-79.
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welfare rights have also met with similar resistance."' Restrictions on
freedom of speech are particularly severe. In 1973, at the time of the
purge of the judiciary, the Tokyo Central Post Office Case, which had
permitted some flexibility in the political activities of public employees, was overruled in the All-Japan Agriculture and Forestry Workers Union (Zennarin) Case."' The Supreme Court accepted the authority of
NPA rules and rejected all distinction among public employees and
their work as a basis for permitting political activity. In 1974, the Supreme Court sanctioned the use of criminal prosecution to prevent
public employees from engaging in electoral activities. In the
Sarufutsu Case, the Supreme Court overturned an acquittal and confirmed a conviction of a postal worker for putting up six political
posters on a public bulletin board during his off-work hours."' That
is, public employees, even non-managerial ones without policy responsibilities, are criminally liable for any electoral activities, even
those which do not affect their work performance and are done outside of work hours and off the work site. The electoral actions of all
citizens are also severely restricted. For example, the absolute prohibition of door-to-door canvassing under the Public Offices Election
Law (K5shoku Senkyo Ho), a ban which has been in place since 1925,
has repeatedly been found constitutional under the public welfare
doctrine because of the mere possibility of bribery."1 The absolute
ban on such person-to-person contact in electioneering, unique
among industrialized democracies, is particularly oppressive because
the law contains so many other restrictions on campaigning.'
The main mechanisms used by the Court to avoid ruling statutes
unconstitutional are, in addition to the political question doctrine,
the public welfare clauses of Articles 12 and 13 of the Constitution,
and deference to legislative and executive discretion. A fourth
mechanism, seen in the voting rights cases and used with greater frequency in recent lower court decisions, is to find a constitutional violation as applied but offer no remedy other than, to seek redress
21
See Osuka, supra note 215, at 277-82 (citing, for example, Makino v. Japan, 19 GYS Iii
1196 (Tokyo Dist. Ct.,JuIV 15, 1969)); Horiki v. Governor of Hyogo Prefecture, 36 MINS1Iii 1236
(Sup. Ct.,July 7, 1982).
2,8 See Tsurusono v. Japan, 27 KEISHU 4, 547 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 25, 1973) [hereinafter All-Japan
Agriculture and Forestry Workers' Union Case], translated in BEER & ITOH, 1970 THROUGH 1990, supra note 8, at 244-86.
2,1 SeeJapan v. Osawa, 28 KEISHiF 9, 393 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 6, 1974)
[hereinafter Sarufutsu Public
Employee Case], translatedin BEER & ITOH, 1970 THROUGH 1990, supra note 8, at 522-43.
SeeApril 15, 1950, Law No. 100.
82 See, e.g., 4 KEISHi 1799 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 1950).
22 These restrictions include, for example, an absolute ban on campaigning by persons less

than 20 yeas old, see April 15, 1950, Law No. 100, art. 137(2), the ban on any election related
posters other than on a public controlled bulletin board announcing the election, see id. at art.
143(15), the ban on the installation of voluntary billboards on private property for campaign
posters, see id. at art. 163(3), the complete ban on demonstrations for campaign purposes, see id.
at art. 140. Moreover, the legal period for electioneering is extremely short, as little as two
weeks in some cases. All campaigning outside of this defined period is illegal.
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from the legislature.'
Some scholars have attempted to chart the
Court's use of these various doctrines."' Beer's claim, for instance, is
that the public welfare clause was used excessively in the early years of
the Constitution's history, but that recently this practice has
stopped.' Such a charitable interpretation, however, is not borne
out by the facts. The public welfare clauses are still used with regularity tojustify executive decisions. There seems to be more justification
in the claim that the courts have moved away from the political question doctrine in favor of a more general rationale of deference to the
legislature. '- This shift has the advantage of de-emphasizing the effect of judicial self-restraint and the political sensitivity of a challenged law in favor of adopting the democratically determined
choices of the Japanese people. Professor Taisuke Kamata characterizes the shift in approach:
Today, courts prefer to apply the legislative discretion doctrine
rather than the political question doctrine when they intend to
avoid constitutional adjudication or to refrain from interfering with
decisions of the political branches of government. According to the
courts' reasoning, under the legislative discretion test, courts refrain
from interference with legislative judgment but retain the power to
settle constitutional questions. If courts apply the political question
doctrine, however, they may have to refrain completely from determining constitutional questions that arise in those cases, and the
political departments or the people themselves may have to make
judgments on questions of constitutionality. In practice, however, when Japanese courts apply the legislative discretion doctrine, they only formally retain the power to settle constitutional questions in that area of contested values. The retained
power is in fact not exercised, as courts refrain from addressing such
issues.
The mechanisms for avoiding constitutional adjudication are not
themselves problematic, although their extensive application and the
low standard of review used to assess the reasonableness of a legislative or administrative determination are causes for concern. These
concerns are especially prevalent when the issue before the Court involves human rights, a fundamental principle of the Constitution and
one that often entails either a restraint on the exercise of governmental power against an individual or a governmental obligation to exert
itself on behalf of classes of individuals disfavored by society. The

SeeOkudaira, supranote 7, at 18-19.
See, eg., BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESsION, supranote 37, at 152.
See id.
-- See Kamata, supra note 197, at 157.
n d
"
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government claims that there is no defined standard for public welfare; rather it must be determined on a case by case basis.' As for
deference to the legislature and the executive, although the Court
very rarely will refuse to defer to unreasonable legislative or executive
determinations, as in the 1975 Pharmacy Case, or more commonly will
try to mitigate the unfair effects of a general rule by innovative by interpretation,' overwhelmingly, the Court holds rules constitutional
even when it finds "a degree of arbitrary judgment" in them.' One
scholar characterized the causes and nature of the limited role of the
Japanese judiciary as follows:
Japan has been in an era of constitutional government in which
strong executive powers have been justified on the grounds that
such power is necessary to achieve economic success and to catch
up to the prosperity of the Western world. Strong executive power
often results in suppression of political opposition and limitations
on judicial independence as law supports economic development at
the expense of civil liberties. The judiciary sacrifices the goal of social justice to protect property rights; it is supported in this by the
executive and legislative branches of government. The judiciary is
not in a position to be an instrument for social, economic, and political change; instead, it performs the conservative task of preserving basic civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and recognized by the Diet and a majority of the population.23'
A similar statement could have been made about the judiciary under
the Meiji Constitution. Despite the change of constitutions after
World War II, the Japanese judiciary has not been effective in enforcing important parts of the Constitution.
The degree to which the Court will sacrifice constitutionally protected civil rights in order to defer to executive discretion can be best
illustrated by the difficult case of a legal alien's freedom of speech. '
In McLean v. Justice Minister, the plaintiff, an American citizen teaching English in Japan, challenged the Justice Minister's refusal to renew his visa based on the plaintiffs participation in lawful political

M See Consideration of Reports Submitted by the States Parties in Accordance with
Article 40 of the
Covenant, Third Periodic Report of States Parties Due in 1991: Japan, Comments of the Human
Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/Add.1 (1992) [hereinafter Third PeriodicReport:Japan] at para. 5.
' See, e.g.,Judgment of 19 March 1982, Supreme Court, 36 MINSHTi 432 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 19,
1982) (holding that special circumstances warrant recognition of paternity even though legally
required deadline of three years had already passed).
See Kamata, supra note 197, at 168.
SeePercy R. Luney,Jr., The Judiciary:Its Organizationand Status in the ParliamentarySystem, in
JAPANESE CONsTrrirrIONAL LAW, supranote 7, at 123, 145.
See McLean v. Justice Minister, 32 MINSHf5 7, 1223 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 4, 1978) (en banc),
translatedin BEER & ITOH, 1970 THROUGH 1990, supra note 7, at 471.
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demonstrations.' Although Mr. McLean committed a technical violation of the Alien Registration Act by failing to notify authorities of a
change in his place of employment, the lower courts and the Supreme Court focused upon the Minister's decision to consider the
undesirable nature of the plaintiff's political activities.' Mr. McLean
had participated in meetings and demonstrations to protest against
the Vietnam War, a Diet bill on immigration control, and the United
States-Japan Security Treaty. Although McLean was a mere participant, rather than a leader in these events, all of which were entirely
peaceful and lawful,' the Ministry ofJustice, in the name of the Minister and using its broad discretionary powers, found that these activities were undesirable for Japan and the Japanese peopleY The plaintiff argued that the Minister's decision constituted an abuse of
discretion and a violation of Articles 14 (equal protection), 16 (right
of peaceful petition), 19 (freedom of thought and conscience) and
21 (freedom of assembly and association) of the Constitution.P
The Court disagreed. The Court recognized that the guarantees
of fundamental human rights contained in Chapter Three of the
Constitution applied to foreigners, but with significant limitations because aliens are permitted to live in Japan only at the discretion of
the Minister ofJustice:'
Consequently, it is appropriate to interpret the constitutional guarantee of fundamental human rights to aliens as going no further
than the system described above, a guarantee of a limitation on the
State's discretion [to decide] whether or not to allow them to stay in
Japan.... Even when the conduct of aliens during their stay is in
accord with the Constitution and is lawful, if the Minister ofJustice
determines that the conduct of the alien is undesirable for Japan
from the perspective of propriety, or if it is inferred from the said
conduct that there is danger in the future that the said alien will
behave in a way harmful to Japan's interests, this does not amount
to depriving the alien of constitutional protection,
Since the constitutional protection for an alien, even for conduct
"in accord" with the Constitution, extends only as far as the Ministry
ofJustice permits, the issue then became the standard for the limitation of the state's discretion. The Court articulated a very low standard for constitutional review, which remains the controlling law today. The Minister's discretion is limited only by a factual mistake,
See id.
at 472-73.
See id. at 477.
..See i& at 473.
.. See id. at 478.
See id. at 474.
See id.
at 477.
id
"3
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such as a case of mistaken identity, or his own "clearly unreasonable"
evaluation of the facts.5" This standard is an extreme version of the
rational basis test; the person challenging the determination must
show that the administrative decision is manifestly devoid of reason.
Consequently, such administrative decisions are virtually immune
from judicial reversal."' While the Constitution does apply to aliens,
the scope of protection for foreigners is entirely dependent on what
the Ministry of Justice, assuming its decision is not manifestly irrational, determines to be appropriate.
The McLean rule, and the Japanese courts' inaction regarding
constitutional protection for aliens, falls far short of SCAP's original
proposal to specifically include aliens under the Constitution."' They
are also inconsistent with the seemingly innocuous negotiations between SCAP and the reigning Japanese government over the phrases
"people ofJapan" or "the Japanese." The McLean standard is indicative of the Court's incorporation of post-war governmental policy into
constitutional law doctrine. As a result, by the late 1970s, constitutional protections for both Japanese and aliens had reached a low
point.
There are many theories to account for the decline in human
rights by the Japanese courts in the forty years after the Constitution
became effective. 4 ' The civil code legacy from before the war, institutional inertia, and the cultural values of the ruling elite, including the
bureaucratic elite of the judiciary, all played significant roles in this
decline. For a complete picture of the development in human rights
protections, however, one must also see these events in their larger
historical context. Forces pressing for social transformation to build
a "democracy from below" were blocked." By refusing to enforce the
Constitution, the judiciary, lead by the GS and the Supreme Court,
did not so much Japanize the Constitution, as help to amend it. Especially through extensive use of the doctrine of deferense to the executive and legislature, Japanese courts have, to a large extent, restored the key element of the Meiji Constitution. Once again
executive actions and statutes determine the scope of Constitutional
240

See id. at 476 ("If [either the decision lacked a factual basis or the evaluation of the facts

wvas unreasonable], then it can be said that there was a violation of law, as the Minister's decision would have exceeded the scope of his discretionary authority.").
2'4 Japanese lawyers refer to the McLean standard as the fool's (baka) standard; only if the
Minister ofJustice's act is clearly the act of a fool will the courts intervene.
.' Article XVI of the American Draft of the Constitution granted much broader protections.
See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text discussing the narrowing of protections for aliens
during the constitutional drafting process.
W See Okudaira, supra note 7, at 31 (presenting the traditional and narrow
concept of judicial power and bureaucratization of the Supreme Court inhibiting judicial review); Tomatsu,
supra note 200, at 202 (arguing that the difficulty in obtaining compliance from the Diet and
the executive branch causes judicial reluctance to develop standards for heightened scrutiny).
'" For a detailed discussion of how the development of democracy was stymied in post-war
Japan, see IROKAVA, supranote 27, at 121.
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protection. Each of the three basic principles, including popular sovereignty, pacifism, and human rights have become pale shadows of
their original dimensions in 1946.2'
IV.INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAws
AND THEJAPANESE CONSTITUTION
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, external events occurred which
gradually affected the guarantees of fundamental human rights in Japan and may help restore the scope of legal protection for human
rights to the dimensions imagined by many at the birth of the Constitution." The United Nations, as part of its initial mandate to establish an international bill of rights, sponsored the drafting of a series
of international human rights treaties. The political pressures at the
end of World War II to establish human rights on a firm legal basis,
which had come to bear injapan via SCAP's involvement in the drafting of the Japanese Constitution, also influenced the nascent United
Nations. After delays caused by East-West confrontations and First
and Third World conflict, draft treaties began to emerge and new
drafting projects were undertaken. Japan ratified a selection of these
human rights treaties, including: the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (entered into force forJapan, June
21, 1979); the International Convention on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICERS) (entered into force for Japan, June 21,
1979); the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (CR) (entered into force forJapan, January 1, 1982); and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) (entered into force for Japan, July 25, 1985). Finally, Japan ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (entered into force forJapan, May 22, 1994).2'
A. Conflict Over the Impact of the ICCPRonJapaneseDomestic Lm

", Consideration of popular sovereignty, and the position of the Emperor under tie Constitution, falls outside the limits of this paper, but this principle, like pacifism and humax rights,
has been significantly eroded. For a survey of the emperor system under the Constitution, see
Yoichi Higuchi, The Constitution and the Emperor System: Is Revisionism Alir?, in JAP.ANESE
CONSrTrTUTONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 57. For a subtle analysis of the relationship between the
emperor and the Japanese in the postwar period, see IRoKAA, supra note 27, at 108-37.
. Japanese law yers and various citizens groups quickly began to explore tie possibilities of
international human rights treaties as a source of enforceable rights. For an early assssment of
the potential of the ICCPR, see LawTence Repeta, Introducion to the First Fe Asues of 'Ctrn"
Human Rights Reports" by theJapanCivil Liberties Union, 20 L-,W LNJAPANV I (1987).
..Japan has not ratified a number of other human rights treaties, most notably the First and
Second Optional Protocols of the ICCPR. For a complete list of the treaties and ILO conventions which Japan has not ratified, see Yuji Iwasawa, InternationalHuman Rights Adjudiration in
Japan, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN Do.MEsrc COURTS 223 (Benedetto
Conforti & Francesco Franconi eds., 1997).
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Great controversy persists, both inside Japan and around the
world, over whether such treaties represent universal or merely western values." ' Nevertheless, the Japanese government ratified these
documents on behalf of the Japanese people after conducting what
were by its own account careful reviews of its legal system to ensure
compliance."9 Furthermore, the government of Japan made no significant reservations to these treaties.'
Duly ratified treaties have the force of law in Japan under Article
98(2) of the Constitution, which states: "[T]reaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed."" ' As
a matter of abstraction, the government, courts and the majority of
scholars, all agree that this provision means that treaties are incorporated into the Japanese domestic legal system."
Therefore, the
ICCPR, which is immediately legally binding on state parties and provides detailed rights for individuals, should be an important part of
the Japanese legal system." '
The majority of Japanese scholars have adopted the concept of
" See, e.g., Bilahari Kausikan, An Asian Approach to Human Rights, ASIL PROC. 46 (1995).
...
See Iwasawa, supra note 247, at 223.
Japan made only one minor reservation to the ICCPR. Japan reserved to right to interpret the term "police" in Article 22(a) to included fire fighters. Consequently, the right to
strike for fire fighters may also be restricted or prohibited by law.
KENP1 art. 98(2).
'
See Iwasawa, supra note 247, at 227.
2 The impact of other treaties is contested injapan. Brushing aside the interpretation that
the ICESCR imposes certain minimal core obligations (such as non-discrimination) immediately on all state parties regardless of their level of development, the Government of Japan
claims that because the obligations of the ICESCR are to be progressively enforced, Japan has
no legal obligations under the treaty. The Government also denies it has any legally binding
obligations under the CRC.
The greatest area of contention is the implementation of the ICCPR. The Government,
Supreme Court and the Ministry ofJustice all strongly resist ratifying the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which provides for individual complaints to the Human Rights Committee,
on the theory that the interpretations of the ICCPR found in the "views" or quasi-case law issued
by the Human Rights Committee under the First Optional Protocol, somehow, do not apply to
Japan if it does not ratify the protocol. The Ministry of Justice regularly argues in Japanese
courts that the Japanese judiciary need not pay heed to the interpretations of the scope of
rights guaranteed in the ICCPR found in the views or interpretive general comments of the
Human Rights Committee. The Supreme Court expresses alarm that ratifying the First Protocol would mean that the Human Rights Committee becomes a court of fourth impression.
Such fears seem exaggerated. Other civil law legal systems have successfully faced the issue of
integrating international human rights law into their systems. See Alexander H. E. Morawa &
Christoph Schreuer, The Role ofDomestic Courts in the Enforcement of InternationalHuman Rights-A
View from Austria, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIc COURTS, supra
note 247, at 175; Bruno Simma et al., The Role of German Courts in the Enforcement of International
Human Rights, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS, supra note
247, at 71. The literature on the issue of sovereignty and international human rights obligations is burgeoning. See, e.g., Henry Burmester, National Sovereignty, Independence and the Impact
of Treaties and InternationalStandards, 17 SYDNEY L. REv. 127 (1995); Jacques Robert, Constitutional and InternationalProtection of Human Rights: Competing or Complementary Systems?, 15 HUI.
RTS. L. J. 1 (1994); Johan D. van der Vyver, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Constitutionaland
InternationalLaw, 5 EMORY INT'LL. REV. 321 (1991).
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self-executing treaties, and at least one scholar argues for a two-stage
analysis of "direct applicability."' Japanese courts, however, have
rarely engaged in such analyses, preferring instead to decide on the
applicability of a treaty without resorting to detailed discussion of selfexecution or direct applicability.' Since the scope of the rights guaranteed by the ICCPR is, in many instances, broader than those constitutional rights narrowed by judicial interpretation, the ICCPR, and
possibly other human rights treaties, effectively rejuvenated litigation
over the breadth of human rights protection in Japan. The issue is
most sharply drawn when the right guaranteed by the ICCPR conflicts
with Japanese statutory law. Furthermore, since constitutional doctrines, such as the public welfare clauses and judicial deference to
legislative and executive discretion, have been repeatedly used to uphold the constitutionality of statutes that severely limit protected
rights, courts also find themselves drawn into questions of direct conflict between the Constitution and the ICCPR.
Even on the issue of treaty-statute conflict, the Japanese government has taken contradictory positions. In the international forum,
the government guaranteed that Japanese courts would enforce the
rights guaranteed by the ICCPR over domestic statutes. In 1992, the
government stated in a report to the Human Rights Committee:
If laws, regulations, or official acts violate the provision of fundamental human rights of the Constitution or ICCPR, it is possible
for the people to bring an action against the violating legislative organs, the administrative organs and/or the judicial authorities. The
court usually plays a major role in the remedy if the rights of the
people [are] infringed, or are likely to be infringed, in contravention of the Constitution or ICCPR_
The court is authorized to judge whether laws, regulations or official acts infringe the Constitution or ICCPR or not. m
In Japanese domestic courts, however, the government has either
dismissed ICCPR claims by individuals out-of-hand, or argued that
the scope of ICCPR protections must be identical with the scope of
protections guaranteed by the Constitution. The courts generally
have agreed. A former Supreme Court Justice characterized the Supreme Court's attitude to arguments based on the ICCPR as "extremely half-hearted" and the response ofJapanese courts as a whole

See Iwasawa, supra note 247, at 237-39.
Unfortunately, Japanese judges are not well prepared for such adjudication. The Legal
Training and Research Institute provides future judges, state attorneys and lai%)wrs uith only a
single one-hour lecture on Article 98(2). See supra note 162 and accompaning text for a discussion of the LTRI. Litigants must regularly instruct judicial panels in even the most basic
matters of human rights treaty law.
Third PeriodicRepot'Japan,supra note 226, at paras. 16-17.
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as "highly negative.""' One scholar summarized the three common
responses offered by the courts to claims based on international human rights law up until 1994: the court either (1) simply ignored arguments based on human rights law; (2) reached a decision based on
the standard interpretation of the Japanese Constitution and summarily dismissed arguments based on international human rights law; or
(3) are simply reluctant to find violations of human rights law."' In
short, despite a constitutional injunction to respect international
treaties, the courts consistently maintained the position that the ratification of the ICCPR had not changed the state's obligations towards
individuals within its territories.
As a result of this divergence, the Human Rights Committee expressed skepticism about the government of Japan's claims that Japanese courts were effectively enforcing the ICCPR.Y In its observations on Japan's Third Periodic Report, the Committee stated:
The Committee believes that it is not clear that the Covenant would
prevail in the case of conflict with domestic legislation and that its
terms are not fully subsumed in the Constitution. Furthermore, it is
also not clear whether the "public welfare" limitation of articles 12
and 13 of the Constitution would26be° applied in a particular situation
in conformity with the Covenant.
The Japanese government's claim that the scope of the rights
guaranteed under the ICCPR and under the Japanese Constitution
are identical is clearly wrong. The most obvious example is the contract between the protection of the fundamental human rights of aliens granted under the ICCPR and their protection under the Japanese Constitution. In contrast with the McLean constitutional rule,"'
the ICCPR in Article 2(1) states, in language reminiscent of the SCAP
draft proposal,"' that:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth

"'
See Iwasawa, supra note 247, at 264 (quoting Ito, Kokusaifinken H6 to Saibansho [InternationalHuman Rights Law and the Courts], KOKuSAIJINKEN 9-10 (1990)).
.. See id

See Official Records of the General Assembly: Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc.
A/49/40 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at paras. 101-12; see infra notes 304-311 and accompanying
text (discussing the Committee's response to Japan's enforcement of the ICCPR).
See id.at para. 105.
'*'
See supra notes 232-242 and accompanying text discussing the Mclean opinion.
26 See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.

1999]

INCOMPLETE REVOLUTIONSAND NOTSO ALIEN TAANPL,.7S

471

or other status. sn

The Committee on Human Rights, charged with overseeing the
implementation of the ICCPR, found, in a view issued pursuant to its
powers to guide state parties under the First Optional Protocol of the
ICCPR, that nationality, or alienage falls within the category of "other
status." In General Comment 15, the Committee stated bluntly: "In
general, the rights set forth in the Covenant apply to everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or her nationality or
statelessness .... Thus, the general rule is that each one of the rights
of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between
citizens and aliens." ' But in Japan, the courts either assume that
ICCPR guarantees are identical to Japanese Constitutional rights or
they apply Japanese doctrines for determining the scope of constitutional rights, such as the public welfare doctrine or, in the case of aliens, the very low reasonableness standard ofjudicial review. There is
no legal basis for these approaches. The reasoning diverges from the
standard methodology for the interpretation of treaties which would
base the interpretation of a treaty on international, not domestic, law.
In addition to the protection of aliens, the scope of ICCPR guaranteed rights is broader than constitutional rights in several other areas. Only a few representative examples will be mentioned here.
The mandate in Article 26 for equal treatment on the basis of sex, social origin, and birth provides legal bases for women, outcastes (burakumin), as well as persons born out of wedlock to demand equal
treatment from the government and governmental action to end discrimination by private actors. ' No similar legal guarantees exist in
Japanese domestic law.'s Articles 9 (liberty and security of person)
and Articles 14 (procedural guarantees in civil and criminal trials)
would require significant changes in Japanese laws and governmental
practices if fully implemented. Article 9(3), for example, provides
the accused with the right to bail while awaiting trial. In Japan, however, requests for pre-indictment bail are universally rejected on the
grounds that no such institution exists in Japan. Post-indictment bail
is extremely difficult to obtain; approximately eighty percent of indicted people await trial in custody. ' Article 9 (4) provides for a right
ICCPR, supranote 78, at art. 2(1)
General Comment 15, The position of ahens under the Covenant, Human Rights Committee
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 18 (1994), 27th Sess. 1986, at paa. 1-2. (hereinafter General
Comment 15] (internal paragraph numbers removed).
" See ICCPR, supranote 78, at art. 26.
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR obliges State parties both "to respect and ensure" the rights
recognized in the Covenant to all individuals uithin its territory and jurisdiction. See id. at art.
2(1). The Human Rights Committee in its general comment 2, paragraph 1, emphasizes that
these terms require a State party to both refrain from iolating rights and to act positvelv to
ensure the enjoyment of rights.
' SeeJapan Federationof BarAssodations, AlternatireReport to the Fourth PenidicReport ofJapan
on the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights 57 (Sept. 1998). Rel)ing on official gov-
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to a court proceeding to challenge the legality of one's arrest or detention." But the Habeas Corpus Law enacted in 1948 restricts coverage to persons who have been bodily restrained "without any procedure established by law," and does not cover cases where the
custody is illegal as a substantive, as opposed to a procedural, matter." Moreover, Article 4 of the Habeas Corpus Rules, which implement the Habeas Corpus Law, limits protection to cases where there
was either no legal grounds for custody or the law or ordinance was
obviously violated and all other remedies have already been exhausted." The limitations make the availability of habeas corpus relief all but meaningless. Article 14 of the ICCPR mandates adequate
access to counsel to prepare a defense," but such access is severely
restricted in Japan. Treatment in Japanese prisons, in particular,
clearly fall far short of the obligations of the ICCPR.' Most importantly, Article 2(3) requires a State Party to ensure an effective remedy for violation of ICCPR guaranteed rights and to ensure that the
competent authorities in fact enforce such remedies-which is far
from the practice inJapan'
Conflict between the Constitution and the ICCPR is not inevitable. The Japanese government clearly could implement its claim that
the constitutional rights track the ICCPR's guarantees by limiting the

ernment statistics the Association reports that in 1996 only 16.29% of defendants were actually
released on bail. See id. Courts regularly reject applications for post-indictment bail on the basis of reasonable grounds to suspect the defendant may destroy evidence. See id. The evidence
for such reasonable grounds in Japan, however, are often far-fetched: denial of the charge or
remaining silent are taken as indications of the defendant's tendency to destroy evidence and
hence become the basis for denying bail. See id.
'
See ICCPR, supra note 78, at art. 9(4).
'
See Habeas Corpus Act, art. 2 (Law No. 199, July 30, 1948), reprinted in 1 EHS LAW
BULLETIN SERIES,JAPAN AR-1.
"'
See Habeas Corpus Rules, art. 4 (Supreme Court Rules No. 22, Sept. 21, 1948), reprinted in
1 EHS LAW BULLETIN SERIES:JAPAN AS 1-2.
"
See ICCPR, supra note 78, at art. 14.
An outstanding example of a practice which violates the prohibition against degrading
treatment or punishment contained in Article 7 of the ICCPR is the use of leather handcuffs in
Japanese places of detention. Two moveable bracelets are attached to a belt so that a person's
hands may be secured both in front, both in back or one in each location. Because these
leather handcuffs are not removed during eating or elimination, prisoners must either ask a
warder to feed them and clean them after defecation or manage on their own, i.e. place their
faces directly in the food and do without cleaning. To facilitate the use of leather handcuffs,
prisoners under such restraint are clothed in pants with an open crotch. See Alternative Report to
the Fourth Periodic Report supra note 267, at 83. Tokyo High Court ordered compensation to a
prisoner restrained by leather handcuffs in a protection cell of the Chiba Prison on the grounds
that leaving him with his hands bound behind his back all night while he was unable to clean
himself after defecation was an "excessive measure." SeeJudgment of January 21, 1998, Tokyo
High Court. The government had argued that the prisoner had not been forced "to eat like a
dog" because he could have asked a warder to feed him. The judgment became final when the
state did not file an appeal, but the use of leather handcuffs remains an established practice in
Japanese prisons and immigration detention facilities. The Tokyo High Court only found that
this application of handcuffs was illegal, not that the use of such restraints was per se illegal.
m"See ICCPR, supra note 78, at art. 2(3).
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scope of the public welfare limitation introduced into the Constitution by the government during negotiations with SCAP." In its recently submitted Fourth Periodic Report, the government of Japan
seems, momentarily, to take that position, but in fact it hedges:
The Constitution, which refers only to the "public welfare" as
grounds for restricting human rights, seems to be different from the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which specifies
the grounds for restricting individual rights. However, the Constitution applies substantially the same grounds as the Covenant,
through elaborating the content of the concept of "public welfare"
The Constitution is Japan's supreme law, and supersedes the
Covenant in domestic effect. However, since the Constitution can
be interpreted as covering the same range of human rights as the
Covenant, as outlined above, there can be no conflict between the
Constitution and the Covenant.tm
The government implies that there is not a mismatch between
constitutional and ICCPR guaranteed rights, that the public welfare
doctrine is shorthand for the specific limitations spelled out in the
Covenant's substantive provisions and that there "can be no conflict"
between the two sources of law. Groups and individuals inside Japan
strongly disagree with this claim by the government, most notably the
Japan Federation of Bar Associations and the Japanese Civil Liberties
Union. 6 In addition some Japanese judges disagree with this claim.
Around the time of the public rebuke of the Japanese judiciary by the
Human Rights Committee in 1993- 94, a few judges began to recognize and enforce claims based on the ICCPR.
B. JudicialResponses Since 1993
Around 1993 a shift in lower court opinions appeared as these
courts began to recognize international human rights principles in
their opinions. Despite pressure from litigants and the Human

r'4But not all claims can be harmonized. For example, Article 20 of the ICCPR obliges State
Parties to prohibit by law propaganda for war, and any advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred. Japan has no such laws and has been criticized by the Human Rights Committee for
at art. 20.
failure to enact such statutes. See id.
'Z
Considerationof Reports Submitted by the States Parties in Accordance wizth Article 40 of the Cn,nant, FourthPeriodic Report of States PartiesDue in 1996: Japan, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/115/Add. 3
(1997), at paras. 7,11 [hereinafter FourthPeriodicReotrt Japan].
'See, ag.,JapanFederationof BarAssociations,supra note 267, at 3-6;JapanCiilLiberties Union,
1998 Report Concerningthe Present Status ofHuman Rights in Japan:A Report of theJCLU unth regard
to the FourthPeriodicReport ofthe Government ofJapanSubmitted UnderInternationalCovenant on Cwhl
and PoliticalRights (Oct. 1998), at 2-3.
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Rights Committee, recent Supreme Court decisions make it unclear
whether this trend will continue. The lower courts seem to have begun to change around 1993 and as a result the situation is rather
fluid. One possibility is a repeat of the 1970s when lower courts diverged from the direction of an extremely conservative Supreme
Court only to be brought back into line by overturned cases and punishment of disobedient lower courtjudges. Another possibility, however dim, is that the Japanese judiciary as a whole is changing with
Japanese society and that the Supreme Court along with the lower
courts may be tentatively exploring the principled implementation of
the human rights treaties ratified byJapan. Because the temporal sequence seems important, the cases will be discussed in chronological
order, even though in two instances both a district court decision and
the related high court ruling are both described.
To make the shift clear, it may be useful to summarize a typical,
pre-1993 lower court case illustrating the dismissive treatment given
to claims based on international human rights treaties Japan has ratified. On May 23, 1991, the Tokyo District issued a decision on the legality of treating children born out of wedlock differently from legitimate children in domicile registrations.'
A couple living in
Musashino City, who chose not to register their marriage with the city
since registering would have required one of them to adopt the
other's surname,' had a child and sought to register its residency
with the city. The city, acting under a city ordinance issued under its
discretionary authority under the law, listed the child in the register
merely as a child (ko), rather than as the first son/daughter of the
parents.' The parents challenged the city's action, relying on: Articles 13 and 14 of the Constitution; Articles 17 (interference with privacy and the family), 24 (prohibition of discrimination against chil'" SeeJudgment of 23 May 1991, Tokyo District Court, 761 HANREIJIH6 174. Japanese citizens are required by law to be registered as members of a family (koseki system), and as doniciliaries of the city or town in which they reside. The legal regulation of the family system has
been revised to bring it into conformity with the present Constitution. See Hideo Tanaka, Legal
Equality Among Family Members inJapan-TheImpact of the JapaneseConstitution of 1946 on the TraditionalFamily System, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 634 (1980) (explaining the reorganization of the
family to fit in with the new Constitution). But see Tamie L. Bryant, Forthe Sake of the Country, For
the Sake of the Family: The Oppressive Impact of Family Registrationon Women and Minorities in Japan,
39 UCLA L. REV. 109 (1991). The residential registration system (jaiminhyd) is established tinder the Residential Registration Law (unin kihon daichl h6) with a certain degree of discretion
to municipalities over the details of the registers.
In this case, on appeal, the Tokyo High Court found that the city's treatment of the plaintiff had been unreasonably discriminatory. Because the city's practice changed and every child
is now registered merely as a "child" (ko), the Tokyo High Court dismissed the appeal for lack
of standing. SeeJudgment of 22 March 1995, Tokyo High Court, 1529 HANREIJIu0 29. This
case exactly spans the transition in judicial posture discussed in this section.
'- For the requirement of one surname and its impact, see Bryant, supra note 277, at 150-53.
r" The use of the term "child" in this context, rather than a term which indicates sex and
birth order, would clearly indicate that the child is illegitimate. Since copies of the residential
register must be produced for many transactions in Japan, such as entering school or moving
into rented housing, the illegitimacy of the child would be publicized.
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dren based on birth) and 26 (equal protection) of the ICCPR, and
Article 25(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
Tokyo District Court held that there was no violation of any of these
provisions. The judges reasoned that since the Civil Code, which
provides that a marriage is effective only upon registration ith the
government, distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate children, and the purpose of this distinction (protection of the family) is
proper, hence the city's ordinance was reasonable. There was no attempt to state the standard of reasonableness nor to distinguish between the standard of reasonableness under the Constitution and
that under the ICCPR provisions.
But on June 23, 1993, the Tokyo High Court handled a claim
based on the ICCPR and the Convention of the Rights of the Child in
a far different manner.' The plaintiff, born out of wedlock, challenged a provision of the Civil Code which states that the intestate
share guaranteed by law to an illegitimate child shall be one-half of
the share guaranteed to a legitimate child. He claimed that this distinction violated Article 14(1) of the Constitution, Article 24 of the
ICCPR, and Article 2(2) of the Children's Rights Treat), among others. The Tokyo High Court found that the provision violated the
Constitution, but went on further to state that the legitimate objective
of protecting the family must be reconciled with respect for the litiman rights of illegitimate children.'
This stunning decision from the Tokyo High Court, which is second only to the Supreme Court in prestige, received a lot of attention. When two more decisions in favor of plaintiffs who relied on international human rights law appeared in 1994, there seemed to be
the beginning of a trend.
The first case, decided by the Nara District Court involved another
consequence of Japan's differential treatment of illegitimate clildren.' According to an administrative directive involving the application of the Child Support Payment Law (Jid5Fuyc Teale Ho, a child
born out of wedlock loses the right to receive child support payments
from the state if the biological father legally recognizes the child as
his own. Thereafter, the child can only receive benefits if the father
willfully abandons support for more than one year. If the biological
parents are married and then divorce, however, the child may receive
public support immediately. In this case, the mother argued that the
loss of benefits to her child reflected unequal treatment that violated
SeeJudgment of 23 June 1993, Tokyo High Court, 1465 HA.FLRE J116 55; h
supra
W..
note 247, at 283.
" The court's reasoning is not completely dear, but it seems to use ICCPR and CRC as
means to interpret the constitutional provision. See huasau, supra note 217. at 283 (quoting a
portion of the decision). Actually the CRC would not have been effective inJapan unil almnst
a year later, in May 1994, but the court seemed to take into consideration tile contents of the
treaty in its reasoning.
SeeJudgment of 28 September 1994, Nara District Court, 1559 H.MRHJI116 31.
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Article 14(1) of the Constitution, Article 24(1) of the ICCPR and Article 2(1) of the Children's Rights Treaty. The Nara District Court
agreed. It held that the directive violated the Japanese Constitution.
Although the District Court found that there was no need to address
the treaty based claims, the allegations of international law violations
seemed to influence the court's interpretation of the Constitution.
The second case decided by the Osaka High Court was the high
water mark for this line of cases and merits a detailed description.!"
The plaintiff, a Korean political leader, refused to be fingerprinted
again when he applied for a replacement of his damaged registration
card, as the Alien Registration Law required. In the police investigation following his refusal, the plaintiff admitted in a signed statement
all the alleged facts and produced trial appearance guarantees signed
by politicians and community leaders. The police already possessed
the only other evidence, the original, laundry-damaged card. The
plaintiff, however, declined repeated requests to appear for "voluntary" questioning, arguing there was no legitimate reason for interrogation since the only remaining issue was purely legal: whether the
fingerprinting requirement was valid? The police secured an arrest
warrant and seized the plaintiff at home in the early morning hours.
At the police station, the plaintiff was strip-searched, forcibly fingerprinted, and held for the day. While in custody, he was interrogated
by both the police and a public prosecutor; yet, because all relevant
facts had already been admitted, both sessions were brief. The plaintiff claimed the arrest was an illegal abuse of authority and that the
legal requirement of fingerprinting requirement for alien registration violated Articles 13 and 14 of the Constitution, and Articles 7
(degrading treatment) and 26 (prohibition against discrimination/equal protection) of the ICCPR. Thus, the central issue raised
at trial was the correct method of interpreting the scope of protection
under international human rights treaties.
The Osaka High Court held that the arrest violated the Criminal
Procedure Law and that the fingerprinting requirement of the Alien
Registration Law violated Articles 13 and 14 of the Constitution and
Articles 7 and 26 of the ICCPR. The court also held that there is an
accepted method of interpreting the ICCPR under international law

SeeJudgment of 28 October 1994, Osaka High Court, 1513 HANREIJIHO 71, overruled by
Judgment of 7 September 1998, Supreme Court; see also Arrest Over FingerprintingRefusal Not Illegal, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 8, 1998; Gov't Appeals Ruling Over Arrest of FingerprintRefusers, KYODO
NEWs INT'L, Nov. 14, 1994, avialable in LEXIS, IAC (SM) Newsletter Database (TM), Asian Political News. As was discussed earlier, the rights of Korean residents in Japan remained a thorny
issue throughout the postwar period. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text. The introduction of international human rights law into the Japanese legal system had a significant impact on the controversy. SeeYasuaki Onuma, Interplay Between Human Rights Activities and Legal
Standards of Human Rights: A Case Study on the Korean Minority in Japan, 25 CORNELL INT'L L. J.
515 (1992). For a comparison of the treatment of aliens in the United States and Japan, see
Tomoko Inoue, Legal Status of Aliens in the United States andJapan,25 KOBE U.L. REV. 63 (1991).
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and that, despite apparent similarities in terminology between the
Covenant and the Constitution, Japanese constitutional analysis and
Japanese legal doctrines should not be used to determine the meaning of the Covenant. The court also noted that the ICCPR significandy expands individual rights inJapan since the protection against
degrading treatment is not a part of Japanese domestic law. The
court awarded to the plaintiff 400,000 yen in compensation,-" an unusually large amount to be awarded against the state in a human
rights case at the time. The defendants, Kyoto Prefecture and the national government, appealed to the Supreme Court, where the decision was overturned.'
Even before the Supreme Court's decision in the fingerprinting
case, the Japanese Supreme Court may have signaled its displeasure
with this developing line of case law in a delphic opinion in July of
1 9 9 5 .' The Supreme Court ruled en banc, by a ten to five margin,
that the Civil Code provision allowing an illegitimate child to inherit
only half the share to which a legitimate child is entided is constitutional.' The majority did rule on ICCPR guaranteed rights, but referred in passing to Article 24 of the ICCPR. The five dissenting justices asserted the importance of Article 26 of the ICCPR, indicating
that the Court was divided on the appropriate legal weight to be
given to human rights treaties in the Japanese legal system.
Later in 1995, a three-judge panel of the Osaka High Court,
headed by the same chiefjudge who had authored the 1994 groundbreaking fingerpriting/police abuse decision, Judge Yamanaka Noriyuki, overruled the Nara District Court decision invalidating the differential provision of public support for legitimate and illegitimate
children.' The holding possibly reflects the Supreme Court's negative signal. The Osaka High Court held that the right to social security, found in Article 25 of the Constitution,'m is subject to wide legislative discretion and that the differential treatment based on a child's
illegitimacy is within that legislative discretion and, therefore, did not
violate the ICCPR.
Despite setbacks in the area of family law, pressure from the lower
See Gov't Appeals Ruling OverArmst ofFingnprintRef so.s supranote 283.
See id, see supranotes 302 and accompanying text for discussion of te Supreme Court's
decision.
SeeJudgment of 5 July 1995, Supreme Court, 1540 HANREI JH6 3; see also DusWnmatian
Against llegitimateChild Constitition4al KYODO NEWS INT'LJuly 10. 1995. ianilabh in LEXIS. LAC
(SM) Newsletter Database (TM), Japan Policy & Politics. The plaintiffs were different from
those in the 1991 Tokyo District Court case, see supra note 277 and accompanying text, but ie
challenged provision, Civil Code art. 900, %as the same.
SeeJudgment of 5July 1995, Supreme Court, 1540 HANRIJtHI6 3.
SeeJudgment of 21 November 1995, Osaka High Court, 1559 HA.NREIJIII6 26. revkJudgment of 28 September 1994, Nara District Court, 1559 HANREIJIHO 31; see also supra note 282
and accompanying text.
See KENP6 art. 25 ("In all spheres of life, laws shall be designed for the promotion and extension of social welfare, and security, and of freedom,justice and democracy.').
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courts to recognize and to enforce ICCPR-based rights has continued
in two other legal realms: the rights of prisoners and the rights of minorities. Individuals incarcerated in Japan have very limited access to
the outside world. A prisoner in Tokushima prison who sought to
bring a civil suit for damages against the national government for alleged violent treatment by warders had difficulty consulting with his
team of three lawyers.' The prison rules provided that only the lawyer appealing the original conviction could meet with the prisoner
without a prison official present. Since the consultations at issue did
not concern a criminal appeal, the prisoner's conversations about the
civil suit against the prison had to be carried out in the presence and
hearing of prison officials. Furthermore, the regulation limited lawyers' visits to a thirty-minute maximum. The prisoner and his attorneys sued, arguing that these prison rules violated Article 14(1) of the
ICCPR, which provides the right to equality before the courts and tribunals, by interfering with the attorney-client relationship. The Tokushima District Court agreed. It broadened the application of the
ICCPR in the Japanese legal system and placed it above statutes in
terms of legal import. The court held that the rules themselves were
legal because they allowed for exceptions in special circumstances
with the permission of the head of the prison, but further held that
the regulation should be interpreted in accordance with the ICCPR
and that the prison head must not have discretionary power to determine under what circumstances exceptions should be permitted.
The court further concluded that consultations between prisoners
and lawyers for civil cases should be freely permitted, except where
there is reasonable cause for restriction, such as in the case of criminal defense consultations. In the instant case, the court found that
the imposition of a 30-minute limit was illegal under Article 14(1) of
the ICCPR and violated the prisoner's constitutional right to consult
an attorney and the lawyers' implied constitutional right to defend a
client. However, the court determined that the presence of the
guard during the attorney-client consultation was legal. The court
awarded modest monetary compensation to the prisoner and each of
his attorneys."'
In March of 1997, the Sapporo District Court delivered its decision in the Ainu Rights case.' The Ainu, an indigenous people of
Northern Japan, are physically and culturally distinct from the majorSeeJudgment of March 15, 1996, Tokushima District Court, 1597 HANREIJIH11 115, affl
Judgment of 25 November 1997, Takamatsu High Court.
"' The court awarded the prisoner 500,000 yen and 100,000, 200,000 and 350,000 yen respectively to his three lawyers.
' See Judgment of 27 March 1997, Sapporo District Court, 1598 HANREI JIU16 33; see also
Benedict Kingsbury, "IndigenousPeople" in InternationalLaw: A ConstructivistApproach to the Asian
Controversy, 92 AM.J. INT'L L. 414, 438 (1998); Toshiaki Sonohara, Toward a Genuine Redress for
an Unjust Past: The NibutaniDam Case, 4 MURDOCH U. ELECT. &J.L. (1997) (last visited Nov. 25,
1998) <http://Nwvv.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v4n2/sonoha42.html>.
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ity of Japanese."3 In the Nibutani area of Hokkaido, the prefectural
government confiscated sacred Ainu land for the construction of a
public dam. ' The Ainu who formerly ownred the land sued the Hokkaido Committee for Expropriation, asking the Court to void the
Committee's decision to confiscate this land, and arguing that the
decision violated Article 13 of the Constitution and Article 27 of the
ICCPR, both of which protect minorities. " The Sapporo District
Court agreed that the taking of the land violated both provisions of
the Constitution and the ICCPR,m but the court failed to provide the
plaintiffs with a remedy.'7 Since the dam had already been built, the
Court concluded that the Ainu ruins and religious sanctuary were unrecoverable." Furthermore, the court concluded that destruction of
the dam would not benefit the public welfare.' Although technically
this decision advances recognition of human rights through the direct application of the ICCPP, the government hailed the case as a
victory.'
' For a concise account of Ainu history and the Japanese Government's legal and social
policies towards the Ainu, see Richard Siddle, Ainu: Japan's Indvgous Pwphe, miJ,%PxS;'S
MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY 1749 (Michael Wiener ed., 1997).
SeeToshiaki, supranote 292, at para. 14-15.
See id. at para. 16.
See id. at para. 17.
SeeiU at para. 37.
See id. at para. 35-37.
The statutory ground for the ruling was Article 31 of the Administrative Litigation Act
which provides that if revocation inflicts extreme damage on the public interest and tie court.
considering all the circumstances, including the damage to the plaintiffs, inds that remocation
is not in conformity with the public welfare, then the court may declare that the administrative
decision is illegal but nevertheless still dismiss the suit. There was no monetary award because
Hokkaido Prefecture had, when the expropriate was executed, deposited funds with the Bureau
of Law Affairs which could be withdrawn at will by the plaintiffs. See id. at para. 37.
Given the difficulty in obtaining a restraining order to suspend construction of public
works such as a dam (a "preliminary disposition" comparable to a temporary restraining order
for public works requires a showing of "obvious necessity" for a suspension of the order) and
the drawn-out process of civil litigation in Japan where a trial typically takes two years to reach a
decision, it is quite possible that a court will again recognize that the rights of a minority group
have been violated but fail to provide a remedy.
The inadequacy of the protection of minority rights in Japan was discussed extensively
during the hearing on the Fourth Periodic Report before the Human Rights Conmmittee in October 28-29, 1998. See infra notes 305-310. TheJapanese government took the position that the
rights of minorities in Japan are respected because they have exactly the same rights as other
citizens. Committee member Sheinin of Finland pointed out that the ICCPR contains a specific
provision for the protection of minorities (Article 27) because of a special need for te protection of their rights. He then cited the Nibutani Dam Case with its underl)ing public welfare rationale tojustify the refusal of a remedy as a case in point:
And here the government, and partly also te court, used the justification
of public welfare, as it is generally used in the interpretation of the Japanese Constitution. And this is precisely the point-die need for Article 27
of the Covenant is caused by the fact that minorities require protection beyond the test of public welfare of common good. And our Committee has
in its case law under Article 27 emphasized that the test is not the public
welfare, the test is the welfare and continued benefit of the minority culture in question, is in particular the culture of indigenous people. So of
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Finally, the appeal of the Tokushima prisoner's case resulted in an
even firmer stance by the Takamatsu High Court against the state's
intrusion into the attorney-client relationship."' The Court generally
affirmed the lower court decision but went further with respect to the
presence of guards to listen to the consultation, ruling that in some
cases, including the instant one, the presence of a guard is illegal.
A turning point may have come in this line of cases, however, with
a decision by the Supreme Court in the appeal of the Osaka High
Court decision in the abusive arrest case discussed above.' On September 7, 1998, the Supreme Court overturned the decision holding
that given the plaintiff's background of links to a political organization, it could not be said that there was manifestly no reason to arrest
him after he had declined five times to be interrogated voluntarily. "
The Supreme Court made no finding of a positive reason for the arrest, only that it could not be said that it was apparent that there was
no reason to arrest him. That is, the usual standard in Japanese constitutional law of extreme deference to the executive was applied.
Despite extensive arguments by the plaintiffs attorneys on the ICCPR
claims, the very short decision by the Court contains absolutely no
reference to the ICCPR, not even a reason for not dealing with the
plaintiff's claims. The practice of rejecting a claim without addressing it is not unusual in the Japanese judiciary, but it takes on extra
significance in this case given the apparent momentum in the lower
courts to broaden the scope of individuals' rights in Japan through
the recognition of the rights provided in the ICCPR. The Supreme
Court seems to be sending a chilling signal to the lower courts.
C. Recent EvaluationofJapanese Compliance Before the Human Rights
Committee
The use of international human rights law by groups and individuals pressing for the protection of human rights in Japan means
course the general welfare of the public population by and large has a certain role to play also in cases related to indigenous or minority cultural
practices, but that role is limited by the priority of the welfare and continued existence of the minority way of life, the separate, distinct culture.
Sheinin, Remarks at the Human Rights Committee Meeting for Fourth Periodic Report (Oct. 28-29,
1998) (on file with author). The Sapporo High Court did not grasp the distinction articulated
by Sheinin.
An additional difficulty is the procedure used in civil cases. Under Japanese procedure,
courts have a series of so-called "jumping hearings" which last less than 3 hours and are separated by recesses of four to six weeks. As a result, the average time from the opening of a trial
to judgment is two years.
"' SeeJudgment of 25 November 1997, Takamatsu High Court (released by the court but not
yet reported). The High Court reduced the lower court's award of monetary damages from
100,000 yen per refusal to 50,000 yen.
See Arrest Over FingerprintingRefusal Not Illegal Supreme Court Rules, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 8,
1998, availablein LEXIS, IAC (SM) Newsletter Database (TM).
' See id-
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the government ofJapan must be publicly accountable in an international forum for its actions' Only six weeks after the Supreme Court
ignored the ICCPR claims in the abusive arrest case discussed above,
the government of Japan defended its human rights record and its
implementation of the ICCPR before the Human Rights Committee.' Japanese NGOs were well represented ith more than 120
counter reports submitted to the Committee. Despite the fact that
the Committee had five years earlier in its concluding observations to
the hearings on the Third Periodic Report expressed eight principle
subjects of concern and had made four specific recommendations for
change,' the government ofJapan in the intervening time had taken
virtually no action. The Committee found the arguments made by
the government representatives even more frustrating. Repeatedly,
the representatives simply asserted that they considered their domestic laws and practices, which do not conform to Covenant, to be reasonable. One representative even flatly informed the Committee that
the differential treatment of children born out of wedlock with respect to intestate share is not unreasonable and hence not a violation
of Article 24 or 26 of the ICCPRL The representative made this argument even though the Committee had informed the government
five years earlier in concluding observations that "discrimination in
their right to inherit is not consistent with Article 26 of the Covenant." ' The Chair, Madame Chanet, countered in her final statement that the government of Japan seems to misunderstand the role
of the Committee and that there is some sort of "blockage" in the
positions taken by the government.'
Since Japan has not declared under Article 41 of the ICCPR its acceptance of the Committee's competence to mediate complaints againstJapan by other states, or ratified the First
Optional Protocol, which provides for complaints by individuals to the Committee, the only
mechanism for the international monitoring ofJapan's implementation of the lCCPR is periodic reporting to the Committee under Article 40.
See Considerationof Reports Submitted by States Parties UnderArticle 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Human Rights Committee, 64th Sess..
CCPR/C/79/Add.102, at para. 2 [hereinafter Japan, Human Rights Committee, 199S Concluding
Observations]. These observations are included in full in the appendix following this article.
See ConsiderationofReports Submittetd by States PartiesUnderArtide40 of the Corenant,Reprts of
the Human Rights Committee, 1993 Concluding Observations, Human Rights Committee UN GAOR
Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) at paras. 8-19.
I& atpa.ra 11.
'
See Christine Chanet, Chairperson, Remarks at the Human Rights Committee Wrsng on the
Fourth Perodic Report (Oct. 28-29, 1998) (on file with Author). The Committee was especially
distressed by the representatives use of statistics to justify human rights violations. For example,
the government sought to show that its extremely restrictive prison rules were not violative of
human rights because in a sampling of prisoners surveyed at their time of release in 1997 and
1998 nearly 80 percent stated that they had not found the prison rules very difficult. Committee member Kretzmer of Germany responded:
I do want to put on the record my reaction to one approach of the Japanese delegation, and I am referring to the use of statistics in order to justify
human rights violations. Human rights are not dependent on opinion
polls, and therefore I must say right now that representing us with statistics
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The Committee responded by issuing an unusually long and detailed set of concluding observations that contain thirty principal subjects of concern and recommendations.' The Committee once again
attacked the public welfare limitation on human rights as "vague and
open-ended;" criticized the government's position that its restrictive
domestic laws were "reasonable discrimination;" and cited several
specific laws which should be changed or abolished, such as the requirement under the Alien Registration Law that permanent residents aliens carry an alien registration card at all times, the issue rejected by the Supreme Court six weeks earlier.' ° The Committee
pointed to numerous areas where the ICCPR is not yet properly implemented, such as the rights of aliens, persons in custody, children
born out of wedlock, women, prisoners, especially those on death
row, police investigations including the practice of obtaining confessions under duress, Habeas Corpus limitations, the restriction of
freedom of expression by the Central Labor Relations Commission
and the refusal of the government to compensate disabled women
who had been subjected to forced sterilization. The Committee
strongly urged two institutional changes: an extensive educational
program for training judges, prosecutors and administrative officers
in the government's obligations under the ICCPR, and the establishment of an independent authority for the investigation of human
rights violations with the power to give redress to complainants. Essentially, the Committee urged the government really to carry out its
obligations under the Covenant and provide truly effective remedies
to violations of human rights, starting with a reform of the judiciary.
Chanet summed up the present situation at the close of the hearing when she criticized the government's dismissive attitude towards
the views of Japanese NGOs and pointed out the convergence of

which show that treating people in the manner that has been described
and that has not been denied by the Japanese delegation, that a large
number of people accept that is not in my mind an acceptable reply.
Kretzmer, Remarks at the Human Rights Committee Meeting on the Fourth Periodic Report (Oct. 28-29,
1999) (on file with Author).
See generallyJapan,Human Rights Committee, 1998 ConcludingObservations, supra note 305.
See id. at paras. 8, 11. The government delegation antagonized the Committee by misleading it. When asked for actual court cases that showed the recognition rights guaranteed
under the ICCPR by courts and the effective implementation of the Covenant, a government
spokesman cited the Osaka High Court decision in the abusive arrest of a fingerprint refuser
and the Takamatsu High Court decision on prisoner rights. See supra note 301 and accompanying text. But he did not inform the Committee that in both cases the government sought to
overturn these decisions and that the Supreme Court had six weeks earlier overturned the
Osaka High Court decision. When the delegation from the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations informed the Committee of these facts, Committee member Rajsoomer Lallah of Mauritius, himself a former Supreme CourtJustice, obtained the unusual permission to ask a followup question right to cross examine the delegation about its misleading statements. The delegation could not provide a reply to his questions. The government simply does not take seriously
its reporting obligation under the ICCPR.
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views of the Committee and Japanese NGOs.'" As in the winter of
1946, the indigenous human rights movement once again finds support and encouragement from a source outside Japan in a struggle
with an extremely conservative regime that is truly hostile to human
rights. Once again, the balance is teetering. Unfortunately, it is difficult to see progress on human rights in the near future because after the close of the hearings the government promptly announced
that it would not implement the recommendations of the Committee.
Also unlikely in the near term is a serious commitment by the Japanese judiciary to broaden the protection of human rights against
government encroachments either through a direct application of
Covenant rights or a reappraisal of constitutional protections in the
light of the government's obligations under international human
rights treaties. However, the various NGOs and individuals committed to popular sovereignty and human rights in Japan do draw
strength from outside confirmation of their efforts. Already articles
analyzing the Committee's position are appearing in popular and
scholarly journals; 12 new waves of lawsuits and educational programs
will undoubtedly follow. At stake ultimately will be control of the
Constitution and its human rights component. The fight is not over
alien influences, but over the control of the state.
CONCLUSION

Far from being a mere alien transplant that failed, the Japanese
Constitution is an important element of an ongoing process of social
change injapan that has been unfolding for more than one hundred
years. The Japanese Constitution, with its explicit, albeit qualified,
commitment to human rights, arose from many forces within Japanese society, the balance of which has been tipped by the United
States, first in favor of pacifism and enforceable individual rights, and
later in favor of remilitarization and the reimposition of centralized,
conservative authority under the LDP over popular sovereignty. As a
result, Japanese society has become politically centralized, with a
moribund democracy and little public deliberation of the country's
policies and goals. The consequences for the legal system have been
a gradual reinterpretation of the Constitution to reduce its requirements to what the LDP-controlled Diet and executive say they are
"

See Chanet, supra note 308.

1

See, eg., Sylvia Brown Hamano, Kiyakufinden linhai nioru Nihon Sifu Ha

sho Shrnsa no

Igi [The Signficance of the Examination of the Japanese Cotvmmental Report by the ICCPR Hurtah
ins m
Rights Committee], 50JrY&TO SEIGI 4, 134-48 (1999); Iszkawa Evi, Kouzac KnTahufnlben
okeru Nthon no Tei)akukoku Hokokusho DaioniiShinsa to NGO [The Fourth Examniaion of theJapanese Governmental Report Before the U.N. ICCPR Human Rights Committee and VGOj. 44 (2)
H6GAKU SFMI"NA 65-67 (1999); KAIDO Y-UICHI & KFJjI SHIHO, KEIJi KOKLv. BUNY\ NO KOKS.I
LW A%'D
JwnKEN H6 [INTERNATIONAL HUNLAN RIGHTS LMw IN THE FIELD OF CRai.INL
DETEN'ION] 36-37 (1999).
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willing to do, a result eerily reminiscent of the Meiji Constitution. A
by-product of this process apparently is the serious, albeit bureaucratic and thus somewhat obscured intrusion of political manipulation of the Japanese judiciary by the power brokers of the LDP.
Given such a grim picture it is all the more remarkable that Japanese citizens, including socially marginalized individuals, resident aliens and their lawyers have continued over the last fifty years to turn
to the courts for the enforcement of constitutional guarantees. A
considerable sector of the Japanese population maintains that vision
of the Constitution as a source of personal and legal rights and as a
set of limitations on the exercise of power by the legislative and executive branches, despite a growing case law to the contrary. As constitutional avenues atrophied, these individuals and groups pressing
from below for social change have turned increasingly to international human rights law to interpret, supplement or replace constitutional guarantees.
Japan is at a critical juncture. Its postwar economic and political
mechanisms have outlasted their usefulness and now obstruct the orderly development of Japanese society. As Japanese society enters a
period of convulsive change, the Constitution will assume increasing
importance as a framework for containing an orderly struggle over
the restructuring ofJapanese society. The concern is that the Constitution has been so weakened and eviscerated as a meaningful document that it cannot fulfill this role. As one famous Japanese legal
scholar, Professor Okudaira, wrote in 1993:
At the moment, I cannot systematically describe and clearly
evaluate what constitutes the characteristics of the function (instead
of the text) of the Japanese Constitution and whether these characteristics, if any, bode well or ill for the future of Japan. Nevertheless, I am somehow rather more optimistic than pessimistic about
the healthy development of modem constitutionalism in Japan-on
the condition that it will not confront an unexpected, extraordinary
crisis, either political or economic, in or out of the country's domain."'
Constitutionalism in Japan is strong enough for the ordinary shocks
of life but may not be sufficient for severe or revolutionary conditions. One can only hope that Professor Okudaira is wrong and that
the sectors ofJapanese society which support the Constitution and its
ideals will prevail as the Meiji Revolution continues to unfold in Japan.

...
See Okudaira, supranote 7, at 32.
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APPENDIX
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
Sixty-fourth session
CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS SUBMITTED BY STATES
PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE COVENANT
Concludingobservations of the Human Rights Committee
Japan
19 November 1998

1. The Committee considered the fourth periodic report of Japan
(CCPR/C/115/Add.13 and Corr. 1) at its 1714th to 1717th meetings
(CCPR/SR.1714-1717), held on 28 and 29 October 1998, and
adopted the following concluding observations at its 1726th and
1727th meetings (CCPR/C/SR.1726-1727), held on 5 November
1998.
A. Introduction
2. The Committee expresses its appreciation for the frank and forthright replies given by the delegation to the issues raised by the Committee and the clarifications and explanations given in answer to the
oral questions put by the members of the Committee. The Committee is also appreciative of the presence of the large delegation representing various branches of the Government, which demonstrates the
seriousness of the State party in meeting its obligations under the
Covenant. The Committee also commends the State party for having
given wide publicity to its report and to the work of the Committee. It
welcomes the large number of lawyers and non-governmental organizations present during the discussion of the report.
B. Positive aspects
3. The Committee commends the Government for the ongoing process of bringing its legislation into line with the provisions of the
Covenant. It welcomes the enactment of the Law on the Promotion
of Measures for Human Rights Protection, as well as amendments to
other laws such as the Equal Employment Opportunities Law, the
Standard Labour Law, the Immigration Control and Refugee Recog*U.N.

Doc. CCPR/CI79/Add.102 (1998).
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nition Act, the Penal Code, the Child Welfare Law, the Election Law
and the Entertainment Business Law, and the draft bill aimed at punishing Japanese nationals involved in child prostitution and child
pornography.
4. The Committee notes with satisfaction the establishment, at Cabinet level, of the Council for the Promotion of Gender Equality,
aimed at investigating and developing policies for the achievement of
a gender-equal society and its adoption of the Plan for Gender Equality 2000. The Committee also notes the measures being taken by the
human rights organs of the Ministry ofJustice to deal with the elimination of discrimination and prejudice against students at Korean
schools in Japan, children born out of wedlock and children of the
Ainu minority.
5. The Committee welcomes the abolition of restrictions on women's
eligibility to take the national public service examination, the abolition of discriminatory compulsory retirement, and of dismissals on
grounds of marriage, pregnancy or childbirth.
C. Principalsubjects of concern and recommendations
6. The Committee regrets that its recommendations issued after the
consideration of the third periodic report have largely not been implemented.
7. The Committee stresses that protection of human rights and human rights standards are not determined by popularity polls. It is
concerned by the repeated use of popularity statistics to justify attitudes of the State party that may violate its obligations under the
Covenant.
8. The Committee reiterates its concern about the restrictions which
can be placed on the rights guaranteed in the Covenant on the
grounds of "public welfare", a concept which is vague and openended and which may permit restrictions exceeding those permissible under the Covenant. Following upon its previous observations,
the Committee once again strongly recommends to the State party to
bring its internal law into conformity with the Covenant.
10. More particularly, the Committee is concerned that there is no
independent authority to which complaints of ill-treatment by the police and immigration officials can be addressed for investigation and
redress. The Committee recommends that such an independent body
or authority be set up by the State party without delay.
11. The Committee is concerned about the vagueness of the concept
of "reasonable discrimination", which, in the absence of objective criteria, is incompatible with article 26 of the Covenant. The Committee
finds that the arguments advanced by the State party in support of
this concept are the same as had been advanced during the consid-
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eration of the third periodic report, and which the Committee found
to be unacceptable.
12. The Committee continues to be concerned about discrimination
against children born out of wedlock, particularly with regard to the
issues of nationality, family registers and inheritance rights. It reaffirms its position that pursuant to article 26 of the Covenant, all children are entitled to equal protection, and recommends that the State
party take the necessary measures to amend its legislation, including
article 900, paragraph 4, of the Civil Code.
13. The Committee is concerned about instances of discrimination
against members of the Japanese-Korean minority who are not Japanese citizens, including the non-recognition of Korean schools. The
Committee draws the attention of the State party to General Comment No. 23 (1994) which stresses that protection under article 27
may not be restricted to citizens.
14. The Committee is concerned about the discrimination against
members of the Ainu indigenous minority in regard to language and
higher education, as well as about non-recognition of their land
rights.
15. With regard to the Dowa problem, the Committee acknowledges
the acceptance by the State party of the fact that discrimination persists vis-A-vis members of the Buraku minority with regard to education, income and the system of effective remedies. The Committee
recommends that the State party take measures to put an end to such
discrimination.
16. The Committee is concerned that there still remain in the domestic legal order of the State party discriminatory laws against women,
such as the prohibition for women to remarry within six months following the date of the dissolution or annulment of their marriage
and the different age of marriage for men and women. The Committee recalls that all legal provisions that discriminate against women
are incompatible with articles 2, 3 and 26 of the Covenant and should
be repealed.
17. The Committee reiterates the comment made in its concluding
observations at the end of the consideration ofJapan's third periodic
report that the Alien Registration Law, which makes it a penal offence for alien permanent residents not to carry certificates of registration at all times and imposes criminal sanctions, is incompatible
with article 26 of the Covenant. It once again recommends that such
discriminatory laws be abolished.
18. Article 26 of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition
Act provides that only those foreigners who leave the country with a
permit to re-enter are allowed to return to Japan without losing their
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residents status and that the granting of such permits is entirely
within the discretion of the Minister of Justice. Under this law, foreigners who are second- or third-generation permanent residents in
Japan and whose life activities are based in Japan may be deprived of
their right to leave and re-enter the country. The Committee is of the
view that this provision is incompatible with article 12, paragraphs 2
and 4, of the Covenant. The Committee reminds the State party that
the words "one's own country" are not synonymous with "country of
one's own nationality". The Committee therefore strongly urges the
State party to remove from the law the necessity to obtain a permit to
re-enter prior to departure, in respect of permanent residents like
persons of Korean origin born inJapan.
19. The Committee is concerned about allegations of violence and
sexual harassment of persons detained pending immigration procedures, including harsh conditions of detention, the use of handcuffs
and detention in isolation rooms. Persons held in immigration detention centres may remain there for periods of up to six months and, in
some cases, even up to two years. The Committee recommends that
the State party review the conditions of detention and, if necessary,
take measures to bring the situation into compliance with articles 7
and 9 of the Covenant.
20. The Committee is gravely concerned that the number of crimes
punishable by the death penalty has not been reduced, as was indicated by the delegation at the consideration ofJapan's third periodic
report. The Committee recalls once again that the terms of the
Covenant tend towards the abolition of the death penalty and that
those States which have not already abolished the death penalty are
bound to apply it only for the most serious crimes. The Committee
recommends that Japan take measures towards the abolition of the
death penalty and that, in the meantime, that penalty should be limited to the most serious crimes, in accordance with article 6, paragraph 2, of the Covenant.
21. The Committee remains seriously concerned at the conditions
under which persons are held on death row. In particular, the Committee finds that the undue restrictions on visits and correspondence
and the failure to notify the family and lawyers of the prisoners on
death row of their execution are incompatible with the Covenant.
The Committee recommends that the conditions of detention on
death row be made humane in accordance with articles 7 and 10,
paragraph 1, of the Covenant.
22. The Committee is deeply concerned that the guarantees contained in articles 9, 10 and 14 are not fully complied with in pre-trial
detention in that pre-trial detention may continue for as long as 23
days under police control and is not promptly and effectively brought
under judicial control; the suspect is not entitled to bail during the
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23-day period; there are no rules regulating the time and length of
interrogation; there is no State-appointed counsel to advise and assist
the suspect in custody, there are serious restrictions on access to defence counsel under article 39(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
and the interrogation does not take place in the presence of the
counsel engaged by the suspect. The Committee strongly recommends that the pre-trial detention system in Japan should be reformed with immediate effect to bring it in conformity with articles 9,
10 and 14 of the Covenant.
23. The Committee is concerned that the substitute prison system
(Daiyo Kangoku), though subject to a branch of the police which
does not deal with investigation, is not under the control of a separate authority. This may increase the chances of abuse of the rights of
detainees under articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant. The Committee
reiterates its recommendation, made after consideration of the third
periodic report, that the substitute prison system should be made
compatible with all requirements of the Covenant.
24. The Committee is concerned that rule 4 of the Habeas Corpus
Rules under the Habeas Corpus Law limits the grounds for obtaining
a writ of habeas corpus to (a) the absence of a legal right to place a
person in custody and (b) manifest violation of due process. It also
requires exhaustion of all other remedies. The Committee is of the
view that rule 4 impairs the effectiveness of the remedy for challenging the legality of detention and is therefore incompatible with article
9 of the Covenant. The Committee recommends that the State party
repeal rule 4 and make the remedy of habeas corpus fully effective
without any limitation or restriction.
25. The Committee is deeply concerned about the fact that a large
number of the convictions in criminal trials are based on confessions.
In order to exclude the possibility that confessions are extracted under duress, the Committee strongly recommends that the interrogation of the suspect in police custody or substitute prisons be strictly
monitored, and recorded by electronic means.
26. The Committee is concerned that under the criminal law, there is
no obligation on the prosecution to disclose evidence it may have
gathered in the course of the investigation other than that which it
intends to produce at the trial, and that the defence has no general
right to ask for the disclosure of that material at any stage of the proceedings. The Committee recommends that, in accordance with the
guarantees provided for in article 14, paragraph 3, of the Covenant,
the State party ensure that its law and practice enable the defence to
have access to all relevant material so as not to hamper the right of
defence.
27. The Committee is deeply concerned at many aspects of the prison
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system in Japan which raise serious questions of compliance with articles 2, paragraph 3 (a), 7 and 10 of the Covenant. Specifically, the
Committee is concerned with the following:
(a) Harsh rules of conduct in prisons that restrict the fundamental
rights of prisoners, including freedom of speech, freedom of association and privacy;
(b) Use of harsh punitive measures, including frequent resort to solitary confinement;
(c) Lack of fair and open procedures for deciding on disciplinary
measures against prisoners accused of breaking the rules;
(d) Inadequate protection for prisoners who complain of reprisals by
prison warders;
(e) Lack of a credible system for investigating complaints by prisoners; and
(f) Frequent use of protective measures, such as leather handcuffs,
that may constitute cruel and inhuman treatment.
28. The Committee is concerned that the Central Labour Relations
Commission refuses to hear an application of unfair labour practices
if the workers wear armbands indicating their affiliation to a trade
union. Such an action contravenes articles 19 and 22 of the Covenant. The Committee's view should be brought to the attention of
the Central Labour Relations Commission.
29. Despite the amendment to the Business Entertainment Law, traf
fic in women and insufficient protection for women subject to trafficking and slavery-like practices remain serious concerns under article 8 of the Covenant. In light of information given by the State party
on planned new legislation against child prostitution and child pornography, the Committee is concerned that such measures may not
protect children under the age of 18 when the age limit for sexual
consent is as low as 13. The Committee is also concerned about the
absence of specific legal provisions prohibiting bringing of foreign
children to Japan for the purpose of prostitution, despite the fact that
abduction and sexual exploitation of children are subject to penal
sanctions. The Committee recommends that the situation be brought
into compliance with the State party's obligations under articles 9, 17
and 24 of the Covenant.
30. The Committee continues to be gravely concerned about the high
incidence of violence against women, in particular domestic violence
and rape, and the absence of any remedial measures to eradicate this
practice. The Committee is troubled that the courts in Japan seem to
consider domestic violence, including forced sexual intercourse, as a
normal incident of married life.
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31. The Committee, while acknowledging the abolition of forced sterilization of disabled women, regrets that the law has not provided for
a right of compensation to persons who were subjected to forced sterilization, and recommends that the necessary legal steps be taken.
32. The Committee is concerned that there is no provision for training ofjudges, prosecutors and administrative officers in human rights
under the Covenant. The Committee strongly recommends that such
training be made available. Judicial colloquiums and seminars should
be held to familiarize judges with the provisions of the Covenant. The
Committee's general comments and the Views expressed by the
Committee on communications under the Optional Protocol should
be supplied to the judges.
33. The Committee urges the Government to take action on the
ground of these concluding observations and to consider them in the
preparation of the fifth periodic report. It also recommends that the
State party continue reviewing its laws, and making appropriate
amendments, so as to bring its legislation into full conformity ith
the Covenant. The Committee recommends that the State party take
measures to provide remedies to victims of violations of human rights
and, in particular, that it ratify the Optional Protocol to the Covenant.
34. The Committee expects that in implementing these concluding
observations the State party will engage itself in a dialogue with all
domestic interested parties, including non-governmental organizations. The Committee urges the State party to ensure the i'ide dissemination of its report and of these concluding observations.
35. The Committee has fixed the date of submission of Japan's fifth
periodic report to be October 2002.
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